From efde510a63c28bf09079ad76d1bd05e32750a543 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Burdges Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2018 14:24:32 +0200 Subject: Style and grammar --- taler-fc19/paper.tex | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/taler-fc19/paper.tex b/taler-fc19/paper.tex index d357749..85d37ca 100644 --- a/taler-fc19/paper.tex +++ b/taler-fc19/paper.tex @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ Interactive protocols can access the state maintained by party $P$. While the adversary can freely execute the interactive protocols by creating their own parties, the adversary is not given direct access to the private data -of parties maintained by the challenger in the security games we define later. +of parties maintained by the challenger in the security games which we define later. \begin{itemize} \item $\algo{ExchangeKeygen}(1^{\lambda}, 1^{\kappa}, \mathfrak{D}) \mapsto (\V{sksE}, \V{pksE})$: @@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ adversary can send and receive messages. the customer's secret key, wallet, withdraw/refresh identifiers and accepted contracts. Permanently marks the customer as corrupted. There is nothing ``special'' - about corrupted customers, other than that the adversary has used + about corrupted customers, beyond that the adversary has used \ora{CorruptCustomer} on them in the past. The adversary cannot modify corrupted customer's wallets directly, and must use the oracle again to obtain an updated view on the corrupted customer's private data. @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ transparency game returns $0$ if the adversary has lost, and a positive ``laundering ratio'' if the adversary won. \subsection{Anonymity} -Intuitively, an adversary~$\prt{A}$ (controlling the exchange and merchants) wins the +Intuitively, an adversary~$\prt{A}$ who controls the exchange and merchants wins the anonymity game if they have a non-negligible advantage in correlating spending operations with the withdrawal or refresh operations that created a coin used in the spending operation. @@ -739,9 +739,9 @@ section. For some instantiations, e.g. ones based on zero knowledge proofs, $\kappa$ might be a security parameter in the traditional sense. However for an e-cash -scheme to be useful in practice, the adversary does not need to have only -negligible success probability to win the income transparency game. It -suffices that the financial losses of the adversary in the game are a +scheme to be useful in practice, the adversary need not have only +negligible success probability in the income transparency game. +It suffices that the financial losses of the adversary in the game are a deterrent, after all our purpose of the game is to characterize tax evasion. -- cgit v1.2.3