From 2f9a008f598cf75d05dbc0a799be152380459ab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeffrey Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2017 16:38:57 +0200
Subject: Add years and rearange column explinatons

---
 comparison/comparison.tex | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/comparison/comparison.tex b/comparison/comparison.tex
index a980821..2aef6ed 100644
--- a/comparison/comparison.tex
+++ b/comparison/comparison.tex
@@ -34,8 +34,10 @@
 \newcommand\Y{\ding{51}} % {\checkmark}
 \newcommand\N{\ding{55}}
 
-\begin{tabular}{r|cccHHcccccc}
+\begin{tabular}{r|ccccHHcccccc}
 &
+\rot{Year} &
+%
 \rot{Instant enforcement} &
 \rot{Robust anonymity} &
 \rot{Key expiration} &
@@ -52,35 +54,32 @@
 \rot{Change} &
 \rot{Receipts \& Refunds}
 \\ \hline
-Taler
-&  \Y & \Y & \Y
-&  \N &  S & \Y
-% &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
-&  \Y & \Y & \N 
-&  ON & \Y
-\\
 Digicash \cite{chaum1983,schoenmakers1997security}
+& 1983
 &  \Y & \Y & \Y
 &  \N &  S & \N
 % &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
 &  \Y & \Y & \N 
 &  \N & \N
 \\
-Tracz \cite{tracz2001} % HINDE
-&  \Y & \Y & %?
-&  \N  &  S & \N
-% &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
-&  \Y & \Y & \N 
-&  ON & \N
-\\
 Offline Chaum \cite{chaum1990}
+& 1990
 &  \N & \N & %?
 &  \N &  S & \N
 % &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
 &  \Y & \N & \N
 & OFF & \N
 \\
+Tracz \cite{tracz2001} % HINDE
+& 2001 
+&  \Y & \Y & %?
+&  \N  &  S & \N
+% &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
+&  \Y & \Y & \N 
+&  ON & \N
+\\
 Compact \cite{camenisch2005}
+& 2005 
 &  \N & \N & %?
 &  \N &  S & \N
 % &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
@@ -88,18 +87,28 @@ Compact \cite{camenisch2005}
 & OFF & \N
 % \\
 % Martens \cite{maertens2015}
+% & 2015
 % &  \N & \N & %?
 % &  \N &  S & \N
 % % &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
 % &  \Y & \N & W % We're guessing trustless anonymity because not trusted setup
 % & OFF & \N
 \\
-Divisible \cite{canard2015scalable}
+Divisible \cite{pointcheval2017}
+& 2017
 &  \N & \N & %?
 &  \N &  S & \N
 % &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
 &  \N & \N & W
 & OFF & \N
+\\
+Taler
+& 2017
+&  \Y & \Y & \Y
+&  \N &  S & \Y
+% &  $\log n$ & $\log n$ 
+&  \Y & \Y & \N 
+&  ON & \Y
 % \\
 % Compact Taler
 % &  \Y & \Y & \Y
@@ -120,9 +129,6 @@ Divisible \cite{canard2015scalable}
 \section{Criteria}
 
 \begin{itemize}
-  \item \textbf{Key expiration.}
-    How/when do keys expire.  
-    How do users exchange old coins for new coins?
   \item \textbf{Instant enforcement.}
     In the past, payment schemes needed to function even when neither
     party had connectivity, which makes double spending unavoidable.  
@@ -136,28 +142,15 @@ Divisible \cite{canard2015scalable}
     Required for good operational security.
     Inherently conflicts with offline double spending detection.
     % Exculpability under ...
-  \item \textbf{Traceability.}
-    A threshold of authorities can deanonymize a customer. % if required (e.g. to catch a criminal).
-    Also makes anonymity brittle.
-    % TODO: Should this be Untraceability?
-  \item \textbf{Transferability.}
-    Ability to transfer a coin from one user to another.
-    None/Sharing/Transfer.
+  \item \textbf{Key expiration.}
+    How/when do keys expire.  
+    How do users exchange old coins for new coins?
   \item \textbf{Taxability.}
     Is income transparent to the exchange?  Do reliable transfers
     among distrusting parties require that the exchange record the
     transaction.  
     % TODO: Expand definition and cite the successor papers to Zerocash/BOLT
     % that handle regulation?
-  \item \textbf{Change/Divisibility.}
-    Which mechanism is used for divisibility?  (None/OFFline/ONline).
-  \item \textbf{Receipts \& Refunds.}
-    The customer either can prove that they payed for
-    a contract, or they can get their (unlinkable) money back,
-    which provides a form of fair exchange ala \cite{camenisch2007endorsed}.
-    Also merchants can issue refunds for completed transactions.
-    These operations must not introduce linkability or otherwise
-    compromise the customer's anonymity.
   \item \textbf{Trustless anonymity.}
     At present, divisible ecash schemes entrust anonymity properties
     to a trusted setup phase.  Users cannot easily participate in this
@@ -179,12 +172,29 @@ Divisible \cite{canard2015scalable}
     reduction.  These savings are limited however by the exchange's
     storage requirements, and divisible schemes depend upon trusted setup
     for their anonymity properties. 
+  \item \textbf{Change/Divisibility.}
+    Which mechanism is used for divisibility?  (None/OFFline/ONline).
+  \item \textbf{Receipts \& Refunds.}
+    The customer either can prove that they payed for
+    a contract, or they can get their (unlinkable) money back,
+    which provides a form of fair exchange ala \cite{camenisch2007endorsed}.
+    Also merchants can issue refunds for completed transactions.
+    These operations must not introduce linkability or otherwise
+    compromise the customer's anonymity.
 \end{itemize}
 
 
 These are discussion items that do not necessarily need to appear in the table.
 
 \begin{itemize}
+  \item \textbf{Traceability.}
+    A threshold of authorities can deanonymize a customer. % if required (e.g. to catch a criminal).
+    Also makes anonymity brittle.
+    % TODO: Should this be Untraceability?
+  \item \textbf{Transferability.}
+    Ability to transfer a coin from one user to another.
+    None/Sharing/Transfer.
+
   \item \textbf{Withdrawal cost.}
     Asymptotic time and storage costs for the wallet during and after withdrawal.
     Also frequently bandwidth costs for the withdrawal operation.  %TODO: Details?
-- 
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