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author | Florian Dold <florian.dold@gmail.com> | 2018-09-25 13:08:08 +0200 |
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committer | Florian Dold <florian.dold@gmail.com> | 2018-09-25 13:08:08 +0200 |
commit | 6c335f33558b79293ed30bec6fd805ee17f1e206 (patch) | |
tree | f705f79564e32156bfed19d308e01a0e8edc3f50 /taler-fc19 | |
parent | 2393ab3a4d1c24d70c0f56f1514100e4abb17efd (diff) | |
download | papers-6c335f33558b79293ed30bec6fd805ee17f1e206.tar.gz papers-6c335f33558b79293ed30bec6fd805ee17f1e206.tar.bz2 papers-6c335f33558b79293ed30bec6fd805ee17f1e206.zip |
ref schroeder for blindness game enhancement
Diffstat (limited to 'taler-fc19')
-rw-r--r-- | taler-fc19/paper.tex | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/taler-fc19/paper.tex b/taler-fc19/paper.tex index 97fb55c..f9f40a5 100644 --- a/taler-fc19/paper.tex +++ b/taler-fc19/paper.tex @@ -775,7 +775,8 @@ We require the following two security properties for $\textsc{BlindSign}$: \item \emph{blindness}: It should be computationally infeasible for a
malicious signer to decide which of two messages and has been signed first
in two executions with an honest user. The corresponding game can defined as
- in Abe and Okamoto \cite{abe2000provably}.
+ in Abe and Okamoto \cite{abe2000provably}, with the additional enhancement
+ that the adversary generates the signing key \cite{schroder2017security}.
\item \emph{unforgeability}: An adversary that requests $k$ signatures with $\algo{Sign}_{BS}$
is unable to produce $k+1$ valid signatures with non-negligible probability.
\end{itemize}
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