anoying \emph

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/games/games.tex b/games/games.tex
index 5aeffc6..47af485 100644
--- a/games/games.tex
+++ b/games/games.tex
@@ -460,9 +460,9 @@ Let \oraSet{Forge} stand for access to the oracles
   \setlength\itemsep{0em}
   \item $(skE, pkE) \leftarrow \mathrm{ExchangeKeygen}()$ 
   \item $(C_0, \dots, C_\ell) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\oraSet{Forge}}(pkExchange)$
-  \item Our adversary wins if the sum of the unspend value of valid coins in $C_0 \dots, C_\ell$
+  \item Return 1 if the sum of the unspent value of valid coins in $C_0 \dots, C_\ell$
     exceeds the amount withdrawn by corrupted peers.
-  \comment{Return 0 or 1 vs adversary wins or looses}
+  \comment{TODO: Should we define unspent value anywhere?}
 \end{enumerate}
 
 
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ Let $G \in \mathbb{E}$ be the generator of the Ed25519 curve (with Edwards coord
 
 \begin{theorem}
 Assuming unforgeability of signatures (EUF-CMA), Taler
-satisfies \emph{Fairness}.
+satisfies {Fairness}.
 \end{theorem}
 
 \begin{proof}
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ by the user.  In either case, we can extract a forged signature and use \prt{A}
 \begin{theorem}
 In the random oracle model,
 if the RSA known-target inversion problem (RSA-KTI) is hard, then
-Taler satisfies \emph{Unforgeability}.
+Taler satisfies {Unforgeability}.
 % by probabilistic polynomially time adversaries.
 \end{theorem}
 
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ Assuming
 \item Unforgeability
 \item a collision-resistant hash function
 \end{enumerate}
-Taler satisfies \emph{Weak Income Transparency}.
+Taler satisfies {Weak Income Transparency}.
 \end{theorem}
 
 \begin{proof}