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author | Jeff Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> | 2018-09-15 14:24:32 +0200 |
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committer | Jeff Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> | 2018-09-15 14:24:32 +0200 |
commit | efde510a63c28bf09079ad76d1bd05e32750a543 (patch) | |
tree | e5f2807610db0bb123a138c3125e474617cd42fb | |
parent | a6f263e2130b44d661f2f3baeee2d37f461da870 (diff) | |
download | papers-efde510a63c28bf09079ad76d1bd05e32750a543.tar.gz papers-efde510a63c28bf09079ad76d1bd05e32750a543.tar.bz2 papers-efde510a63c28bf09079ad76d1bd05e32750a543.zip |
Style and grammar
-rw-r--r-- | taler-fc19/paper.tex | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/taler-fc19/paper.tex b/taler-fc19/paper.tex index d357749..85d37ca 100644 --- a/taler-fc19/paper.tex +++ b/taler-fc19/paper.tex @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ Interactive protocols can access the state maintained by party $P$. While the adversary can freely execute the interactive protocols by creating
their own parties, the adversary is not given direct access to the private data
-of parties maintained by the challenger in the security games we define later.
+of parties maintained by the challenger in the security games which we define later.
\begin{itemize}
\item $\algo{ExchangeKeygen}(1^{\lambda}, 1^{\kappa}, \mathfrak{D}) \mapsto (\V{sksE}, \V{pksE})$:
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ adversary can send and receive messages. the customer's secret key, wallet, withdraw/refresh identifiers and accepted contracts.
Permanently marks the customer as corrupted. There is nothing ``special''
- about corrupted customers, other than that the adversary has used
+ about corrupted customers, beyond that the adversary has used
\ora{CorruptCustomer} on them in the past. The adversary cannot modify
corrupted customer's wallets directly, and must use the oracle again to
obtain an updated view on the corrupted customer's private data.
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ transparency game returns $0$ if the adversary has lost, and a positive ``laundering ratio'' if the adversary won.
\subsection{Anonymity}
-Intuitively, an adversary~$\prt{A}$ (controlling the exchange and merchants) wins the
+Intuitively, an adversary~$\prt{A}$ who controls the exchange and merchants wins the
anonymity game if they have a non-negligible advantage in correlating spending operations
with the withdrawal or refresh operations that created a coin used in the
spending operation.
@@ -739,9 +739,9 @@ section. For some instantiations, e.g. ones based on zero knowledge proofs, $\kappa$
might be a security parameter in the traditional sense. However for an e-cash
-scheme to be useful in practice, the adversary does not need to have only
-negligible success probability to win the income transparency game. It
-suffices that the financial losses of the adversary in the game are a
+scheme to be useful in practice, the adversary need not have only
+negligible success probability in the income transparency game.
+It suffices that the financial losses of the adversary in the game are a
deterrent, after all our purpose of the game is to characterize tax evasion.
|