avoid double negation

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/taler-fc19/paper.tex b/taler-fc19/paper.tex
index 93ebe6e..5d31e40 100644
--- a/taler-fc19/paper.tex
+++ b/taler-fc19/paper.tex
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ money or privacy.
   \setlength\itemsep{0em}

   \item $(\V{sksE}, \V{pksE}) \leftarrow \mathrm{ExchangeKeygen}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa, M)$ 

   \item $\V{pkCustomer} \leftarrow {\cal A}^{\oraSet{NoShare}}(\V{pksE})$

-  \item Return $0$ if $\V{pkCustomer}$ is not an uncorrupted, registered user.

+  \item Return $0$ if $\V{pkCustomer}$ is a corrupted, registered user.

   \item \label{game:conserv:run} Run $\algo{WithdrawPickup}$ for each withdraw identifier $\V{wid}$

     and $\algo{RefreshPickup}$ for each refresh identifier $\V{rid}$ that the user

     has recorded in $\V{withdrawIds}$ and $\V{refreshIds}$.  Run $\algo{Deposit}$

@@ -780,11 +780,13 @@ We require the following two security properties for $\textsc{BlindSign}$:
 \begin{itemize}

   \item \emph{blindness}: Let $M$ be the set of all possible messages and $\overline{M}$ be the

     set of all possible blinded messages. Then the distribution of

-    \[ \left\{ (m, \sigma, \overline{m}, \overline{\sigma}) \,\middle| 

+    \[ \left\{ (m, \sigma, \overline{m}, \overline{\sigma}) \,\middle|

+          \begin{array}{c}

 	   m\, \randsel M, 

-	   \overline{m} \leftarrow \algo{Blind}_{BS}(\mathcal{S}(\V{sk}), m),

-	   \overline{\sigma} \leftarrow \algo{Sign}_{BS}(\V{sk}, \overline{m}),

+	   \overline{m} \leftarrow \algo{Blind}_{BS}(\mathcal{S}(\V{sk}), m), \\

+	   \overline{\sigma} \leftarrow \algo{Sign}_{BS}(\V{sk}, \overline{m}), \\

 	   \sigma \leftarrow \algo{UnblindSig}_{BS}(r, m, \overline{\sigma})

+          \end{array}

 	   \right\} \]

     must be computationally

     indistinguishable from