GNU

<Taler>

taler.net IRC**#taler**

(on freenode) twitter@taler mail@taler.net Florian Dold & Christian Grothoff

{dold,grothoff}@taler.net

A Social Problem

This was a question posed to RAND researchers in 1971:

"Suppose you were an advisor to the head of the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police. Suppose you are given the assignment of designing a system for the surveillance of all citizens and visitors within the boundaries of the USSR. The system is not to be too obtrusive or obvious. What would be your decision?"



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Mastercard/Visa are too transparent.


"I think one of the big things that we need to do, is we need to get a way from true-name payments on the Internet. The credit card payment system is one of the worst things that happened for the user, in terms of being able to divorce their access from their identity." —Edward Snowden, IETF 93 (2015)



The Bank's Problem

3D secure ("verified by visa") is a nightmare:

- Complicated process
- Shifts liability to consumer
- Significant latency
- Can refuse valid requests
- Legal vendors excluded
- No privacy for buyers



Online credit card payments will be replaced, but with what?



The Bank's Problem

- Global tech companies push oligopolies
- Privacy and federated finance are at risk
- Economic sovereingity is in danger

PayPal^{**}









The Distraction: Bitcoin

Unregulated payment system and currency:
 ⇒ lack of regulation is a feature!

- Implemented in free software
- Decentralised peer-to-peer system



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- Decentralised banking requires solving Byzantine consensus
- Creative solution: tie initial accumulation to solving consensus



The Distraction: Bitcoin


Unregulated payment system and currency:

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- Implemented in free software
- Decentralised peer-to-peer system
- Decentralised banking requires solving Byzantine consensus
- Creative solution: tie initial accumulation to solving consensus
 - \Rightarrow Proof-of-work advances ledger
 - \Rightarrow Very expensive banking







Current average transaction value: \approx 1000 USD





Cryptography is rather primitive:

All Bitcoin transactions are public and linkable!

 \Rightarrow no privacy guarantees

 \Rightarrow enhanced with "laundering" services

ZeroCoin, CryptoNote (Monero) and ZeroCash (ZCash) offer anonymity.



Do you want to have a libertarian economy?

Do you want to live under total surveillance?



GNU Taler

Digital cash, made socially responsible.

(Taler)

Privacy-Preserving, Practical, Taxable, Free Software, Efficient




Taler is an electronic instant payment system.

- ▶ Uses electronic coins stored in **wallets** on customer's device
- Like cash
- Pay in existing currencies (i.e. EUR, USD, BTC), or use it to create new regional currencies




Taler Overview





Architecture of Taler



 \Rightarrow Convenient, taxable, privacy-enhancing, & resource friendly!



Usability of Taler

https://demo.taler.net/

- 1. Install browser extension.
- 2. Visit the bank.demo.taler.net to withdraw coins.
- 3. Visit the shop.demo.taler.net to spend coins.



Social Impact of Taler





Use Case: Journalism

Today:

- Corporate structure
- Advertising primary revenue
- Tracking readers critical for business success
- Journalism and marketing hard to distinguish



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- Corporate structure
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With GNU Taler:

- One-click micropayments per article
- Hosting requires no expertise
- Reader-funded reporting separated from marketing
- Readers can remain anonymous



Use Cases: Refugee Camps

Today:

- Non-bankable
- Direct distribution of goods to population
- Limited economic activity in camps
- High level of economic dependence



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- Non-bankable
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With GNU Taler:

- Local currency issued as basic income backed by aid
- Taxation possible based on economic status
- Local governance enabled by local taxes
- Increased economic independence and political participation



Use Case: Anti-Spam

Today, $p \equiv p$ provides authenticated encryption for e-mail:

- Free software
- Easy to use opportunistic encryption
- Available for Outlook, Android, Enigmail
- Spies & spam filters can no longer inspect content



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With GNU Taler:

- Peer-to-peer payments via e-mail
- If unsolicited sender, hide messages from user & automatically request payment from sender
- Sender can attach payment to be moved to inbox
- Receiver may grant refund to sender



Taxability

We say Taler is taxable because:

- Merchant's income is visible from deposits.
- Hash of contract is part of deposit data.
- State can trace income and enforce taxation.



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Limitations:

- withdraw loophole
- sharing coins among family and friends



We use a few ancient constructions:


- Cryptographic hash function (1989)
- Blind signature (1983)
- Schnorr signature (1989)
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (1976)
- Cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proof (1985)

But of course we use modern instantiations.




Exchange setup: Create a denomination key (RSA)

- 1. Pick random primes p, q.
- 2. Compute n := pq, $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- 3. Pick small $e < \phi(n)$ such that $d := e^{-1} \mod \phi(n)$ exists.
- 4. Publish public key (e, n).







Merchant: Create a signing key (EdDSA)



•
$$M = mG$$
 public key







Customer: Create a planchet (EdDSA)

Pick random c mod o private key
C = cG public key




Capability: $c \Rightarrow$





Customer: Blind planchet (RSA)

- 1. Obtain public key (e, n)
- 2. Compute f := FDH(C), f < n.
- 3. Pick blinding factor $b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
- 4. Transmit $f' := fb^e \mod n$





Exchange: Blind sign (RSA)


transmit Customer

- 1. Receive f'.
- 2. Compute $s' := f'^d \mod n$.
- 3. Send signature s'.




Customer: Unblind coin (RSA)

- 1. Receive s'.
- 2. Compute $s := s'b^{-1} \mod n$






Withdrawing coins on the Web





Customer: Build shopping cart





Merchant Integration: Wallet Detection

```
<script src="taler-wallet-lib.js"></script>
<script>
  taler.onPresent(() => {
    alert("Taler_uwallet_uis_uinstalled");
  });
  taler.onAbsent(() => {
    alert("Taler_uwallet_uis_unot_uinstalled");
  });
</script>
```



Merchant Integration: Payment Request

```
HTTP/1.1 402 Payment Required
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
X-Taler-Contract-Url: https://shop/generate-contract/42
```

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<!-- fallback for browsers without the Taler extension -->
You do not seem to have Taler installed, here are other
payment options ...
</html>
```



Merchant Integration: Contract


{

}

```
"H_wire":"YTHOC4QBCQ10VDNTJNODCTTV2Z6JHT5NF43FORQHZ8JYB5NG4W4G...",
"amount":{"currency":"EUR","fraction":0,"value":1},
"max_fee":{"currency":"EUR","fraction":100000,"value":0},
"auditors": [{"auditor_pub": "42V6TH91Q83FB846DK1GW3JQ5E8DS273W4..."}],
"exchanges":[{"master_pub":"1T5FA8VQHMMKBHDMYPRZA2ZFK2S63AKF0Y...",
              "url":"https://exchange/"}],
"fulfillment_url": "https://shop/article/42?tid=249&time=14714744",
"merchant":{"address":"Mailboxu4242","jurisdiction":"Jersey",
              "name": "ShopuInc."},
"merchant_pub":"Y1ZAR5346J3ZTEXJCHQY9NJN78EZ2HSKZK8M0MYTNRJG5N...",
"products":[{
 "description": "Essay: "The GNU Project",
  "price":{"currency":"EUR","fraction":0,"value":1},
  "product_id":42,"quantity":1}],
"pay_deadline":"/Date(1480119270)/",
"refund_deadline":"/Date(1471522470)/",
"timestamp":"/Date(1471479270)/",
"transaction_id":249960194066269
```



Merchant: Propose contract (EdDSA)



- 1. Complete proposal D.
- 2. Send *D*, $EdDSA_m(D)$

Customer: Spend coin (EdDSA)

- transmit transmit Merchant
 - loria- 🖓 🎆

- 1. Receive proposal D, $EdDSA_m(D)$.
- 2. Send s, C, $EdDSA_c(D)$


Merchant and Exchange: Verify coin (RSA)

$$s^e \stackrel{?}{\equiv} FDH(C) \mod n$$





Payment processing with Taler





Giving change

It would be inefficient to pay EUR 100 with 1 cent coins!

- Denomination key represents value of a coin.
- Exchange may offer various denominations for coins.
- Wallet may not have exact change!
- Usability requires ability to pay given sufficient total funds.



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- Key goals:
 - maintain unlinkability
 - maintain taxability of transactions



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
Method:

- Contract can specify to only pay *partial value* of a coin.
- Exchange allows wallet to obtain *unlinkable change* for remaining coin value.



Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

- 1. Create private keys $c, t \mod o$
- 2. Define C = cG
- 3. Define T = tG
- 4. Compute DH cT = c(tG) = t(cG) = tC





Strawman solution

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old} :

1. Pick random $c_{new} \mod o$ private key


2.
$$C_{new} = c_{new} G$$
 public key

3. Pick random b_{new}

4. Compute
$$f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$$
, $m < n$.

5. Transmit
$$f'_{new} := f_{new} b^e_{new} \mod n$$

... and sign request for change with c_{old} .





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
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Problem: Owner of c_{new} may differ from owner of c_{old} !



Customer: Transfer key setup (ECDH)

Given partially spent private coin key cold:


- 1. Let $C_{old} := c_{old} G$ (as before)
- 2. Create random private transfer key $t \mod o$
- 3. Compute T := tG

4. Compute
$$X := c_{old}(tG) = t(c_{old}G) = tC_{old}$$


5. Derive c_{new} and b_{new} from X

- 6. Compute $C_{new} := c_{new} G$
- 7. Compute $f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$

8. Transmit
$$f'_{new} := f_{new} b^e_{new}$$



Cut-and-Choose



Exchange: Choose!

Exchange sends back random $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ to the customer.





Customer: Reveal

1. If
$$\gamma = 1$$
, send t_2 , t_3 to exchange
2. If $\gamma = 2$, send t_1 , t_3 to exchange
3. If $\gamma = 3$, send t_1 , t_2 to exchange




Exchange: Verify ($\gamma = 2$)








Exchange: Blind sign change (RSA)






Customer: Unblind change (RSA)





Exchange: Allow linking change






Customer: Link (threat!)

- 1. Have *cold*.
- 2. Obtain T_{γ} , s from exchange

3. Compute
$$X_{\gamma} = c_{old} T_{\gamma}$$

- 4. Derive $c_{new,\gamma}$ and $b_{new,\gamma}$ from X_{γ}
- 5. Unblind $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \mod n$



Refresh protocol summary

Customer asks exchange to convert old coin to new coin

- Protocol ensures new coins can be recovered from old coin
- \Rightarrow New coins are owned by the same entity!

Thus, the refresh protocol allows:

- To give unlinkable change.
- To give refunds to an anonymous customer.
- To expire old keys and migrate coins to new ones.
- ► To handle protocol aborts.

Transactions via refresh are equivalent to sharing a wallet.



Competitor comparison

	Cash	Bitcoin	Zerocoin	Creditcard	GNU Taler
Online		++	++	+	+++
Offline	+++			+	
Trans. cost	+			_	++
Speed	+			0	++
Taxation	-			+++	+++
Payer-anon	++	0	++		+++
Payee-anon	++	0	++		
Security	-	0	0		++
Conversion	+++			+++	+++
Libre	-	+++	+++		+++



How to support?

- Join: taler@gnu.org, #taler
- Coding & design: https://gnunet.org/bugs/
- Translation: https://git.taler.net/www.git/tree/ locale/fr/LC_MESSAGES/messages.po
- Integration: https://docs.taler.net/
- Donations: https://gnunet.org/ev
- Funding: https://taler.net/en/investors.html



Conclusion

What can we do?

- Suffer mass-surveillance enabled by credit card oligopolies with high fees, and
- Engage in arms race with deliberately unregulatable blockchains, and
- Enjoy the "benefits" of cash



OR

Establish free software alternative balancing social goals!



Do you have any questions?

References:

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- Jeffrey Burdges, Florian Dold, Christian Grothoff and Marcello Stanisci. Enabling Secure Web Payments with GNU Taler. SPACE 2016.
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Let money facilitate trade; but ensure capital serves society.

