

GNU

<Taler>

taler.net

IRC#taler

(on freenode)

twitter@taler

mail@taler.net

**Florian Dold &
Christian Grothoff**

{dold,grothoff}@taler.net



The World is Moving to Electronic Cash

"In future, cash may be so marginalised that it becomes difficult to use as a means of payment.

(...)

Many central banks are analysing central bank digital currencies (CBDC).

(...)

The arguments in favour of analysing a CBDC to be offered to the general public have been based on the idea that a CBDC is expected to increase financial inclusion and reduce the use of cash, which is considered costly, risky, to have negative environmental effects and to facilitate the black economy." – Riskbank e-Krona Project Report 2

**What will the technical foundation
for CBDC look like?**

The Distraction: Bitcoin


- ▶ Unregulated payment system and currency:
⇒ lack of regulation is a feature!
- ▶ Implemented in free software
- ▶ Decentralised peer-to-peer system

The Distraction: Bitcoin

- ▶ Unregulated payment system and currency:
⇒ lack of regulation is a feature!
- ▶ Implemented in free software
- ▶ Decentralised peer-to-peer system
- ▶ Decentralised banking requires solving Byzantine consensus
- ▶ Creative solution: tie initial accumulation to solving consensus

The Distraction: Bitcoin

- ▶ Unregulated payment system and currency:
 - ⇒ lack of regulation is a feature!
- ▶ Implemented in free software
- ▶ Decentralised peer-to-peer system
- ▶ Decentralised banking requires solving Byzantine consensus
- ▶ Creative solution: tie initial accumulation to solving consensus
 - ⇒ Proof-of-work advances ledger
 - ⇒ Very expensive banking



Current average transaction value: \approx 1000 USD

GNU Taler: Electronic payment system designed as CBDC

Digital cash, made **socially**
responsible.

< T a l e r >


Privacy-Preserving, Practical, Taxable, Free Software, Efficient

What is Taler?


Taler is an electronic instant payment system.

- ▶ Uses electronic coins stored in **wallets** on customer's device
- ▶ Like **cash**
- ▶ Pay in **existing currencies** (i.e. EUR, USD, BTC),
or use it to create new **regional currencies**

Taler Overview



Architecture of Taler




⇒ Convenient, taxable, privacy-enhancing, & resource friendly!

Usability of Taler

`https://demo.taler.net/`

1. Install browser extension.
2. Visit the `bank.demo.taler.net` to withdraw coins.
3. Visit the `shop.demo.taler.net` to spend coins.

Social Impact of Taler



Use Case: Journalism

Today:

- ▶ Corporate structure
- ▶ Advertising primary revenue
- ▶ Tracking readers critical for business success
- ▶ Journalism and marketing hard to distinguish

Use Case: Journalism

Today:

- ▶ Corporate structure
- ▶ Advertising primary revenue
- ▶ Tracking readers critical for business success
- ▶ Journalism and marketing hard to distinguish

With GNU Taler:

- ▶ One-click micropayments per article
- ▶ Hosting requires no expertise
- ▶ Reader-funded reporting separated from marketing
- ▶ Readers can remain anonymous

Use Cases: Refugee Camps

Today:

- ▶ Non-bankable
- ▶ Direct distribution of goods to population
- ▶ Limited economic activity in camps
- ▶ High level of economic dependence

Use Cases: Refugee Camps

Today:

- ▶ Non-bankable
- ▶ Direct distribution of goods to population
- ▶ Limited economic activity in camps
- ▶ High level of economic dependence

With GNU Taler:

- ▶ Local currency issued as basic income backed by aid
- ▶ Taxation possible based on economic status
- ▶ Local governance enabled by local taxes
- ▶ Increased economic independence and political participation

Use Case: Anti-Spam

Today, PGP provides authenticated encryption for e-mail:

- ▶ Free software
- ▶ Easy to use opportunistic encryption
- ▶ Available for Outlook, Android, Enigmail
- ▶ Spies & spam filters can no longer inspect content

Use Case: Anti-Spam

Today, p≡p provides authenticated encryption for e-mail:

- ▶ Free software
- ▶ Easy to use opportunistic encryption
- ▶ Available for Outlook, Android, Enigmail
- ▶ Spies & spam filters can no longer inspect content

With GNU Taler:

- ▶ Peer-to-peer payments via e-mail
- ▶ If unsolicited sender, hide messages from user & automatically request payment from sender
- ▶ Sender can attach payment to be moved to inbox
- ▶ Receiver may grant refund to sender

Taxability

We say Taler is taxable because:

- ▶ Merchant's income is visible from deposits.
- ▶ Hash of contract is part of deposit data.
- ▶ State can trace income and enforce taxation.

Taxability

We say Taler is taxable because:

- ▶ Merchant's income is visible from deposits.
- ▶ Hash of contract is part of deposit data.
- ▶ State can trace income and enforce taxation.

Limitations:

- ▶ withdraw loophole
- ▶ *sharing* coins among family and friends

How does it work?


We use a few ancient constructions:

- ▶ Cryptographic hash function (1989)
- ▶ Blind signature (1983)
- ▶ Schnorr signature (1989)
- ▶ Diffie-Hellman key exchange (1976)
- ▶ Cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proof (1985)

But of course we use modern instantiations.

Exchange setup: Create a denomination key (RSA)

1. Pick random primes p, q .
2. Compute $n := pq$,
 $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
3. Pick small $e < \phi(n)$ such that
 $d := e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$ exists.
4. Publish public key (e, n) .



Merchant: Create a signing key (EdDSA)

- ▶ pick random $m \pmod{o}$ as private key
- ▶ $M = mG$ public key



↓
 m


↓
 M

Capability: $m \Rightarrow$



Customer: Create a planchet (EdDSA)

- ▶ Pick random $c \pmod{o}$ private key
- ▶ $C = cG$ public key




Capability: $c \Rightarrow$




Customer: Blind planchet (RSA)

1. Obtain public key (e, n)
2. Compute $f := FDH(C)$, $f < n$.
3. Pick blinding factor $b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
4. Transmit $f' := fb^e \pmod n$




Exchange: Blind sign (RSA)

1. Receive f' .
2. Compute $s' := f'^d \pmod n$.
3. Send signature s' .




Customer: Unblind coin (RSA)


1. Receive s' .
2. Compute $s := s'b^{-1} \pmod n$



Withdrawing coins on the Web



Customer: Build shopping cart



transmit



Merchant



Merchant Integration: Wallet Detection

```
<script src="taler-wallet-lib.js"></script>
<script>
  taler.onPresent(() => {
    alert("Taler_wallet_is_installed");
  });
  taler.onAbsent(() => {
    alert("Taler_wallet_is_not_installed");
  });
</script>
```

Merchant Integration: Payment Request

```
HTTP/1.1 402 Payment Required
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
X-Taler-Contract-Url: https://shop/generate-contract/42
```


```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <!-- fallback for browsers without the Taler extension -->
  You do not seem to have Taler installed, here are other
  payment options ...
</html>
```

Merchant Integration: Contract

```
{
  "H_wire": "YTHOC4QBCQ10VDNTJNODCTTV2Z6JHT5NF43FORQHZ8JYB5NG4W4G...",
  "amount": {"currency": "EUR", "fraction": 0, "value": 1},
  "max_fee": {"currency": "EUR", "fraction": 100000, "value": 0},
  "auditors": [{"auditor_pub": "42V6TH91Q83FB846DK1GW3JQ5E8DS273W4..."}],
  "exchanges": [{"master_pub": "1T5FA8VQHMMKBHDMYPRZA2ZFK2S63AKFOY...",
    "url": "https://exchange/"}],
  "fulfillment_url": "https://shop/article/42?tid=249&time=14714744",
  "merchant": {"address": "Mailbox_4242", "jurisdiction": "Jersey",
    "name": "Shop_Inc."},
  "merchant_pub": "Y1ZAR5346J3ZTEXJCHQY9NJN78EZ2HSKZK8MOMYTNRJG5N...",
  "products": [{"
    "description": "Essay: The_GNU_Project",
    "price": {"currency": "EUR", "fraction": 0, "value": 1},
    "product_id": 42, "quantity": 1}],
  "pay_deadline": "/Date(1480119270)/",
  "refund_deadline": "/Date(1471522470)/",
  "timestamp": "/Date(1471479270)/",
  "transaction_id": 249960194066269
}
```



Merchant: Propose contract (EdDSA)

1. Complete proposal D .
2. Send $D, EdDSA_m(D)$



Customer: Spend coin (EdDSA)

1. Receive proposal D , $EdDSA_m(D)$.
2. Send s , C , $EdDSA_c(D)$




Merchant and Exchange: Verify coin (RSA)

$$s^e \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \text{FDH}(C) \pmod{n}$$



Payment processing with Taler



Giving change

It would be inefficient to pay EUR 100 with 1 cent coins!

- ▶ Denomination key represents value of a coin.
- ▶ Exchange may offer various denominations for coins.
- ▶ Wallet may not have exact change!
- ▶ Usability requires ability to pay given sufficient total funds.

Giving change

It would be inefficient to pay EUR 100 with 1 cent coins!

- ▶ Denomination key represents value of a coin.
- ▶ Exchange may offer various denominations for coins.
- ▶ Wallet may not have exact change!
- ▶ Usability requires ability to pay given sufficient total funds.

Key goals:

- ▶ maintain unlinkability
- ▶ maintain taxability of transactions

Giving change

It would be inefficient to pay EUR 100 with 1 cent coins!

- ▶ Denomination key represents value of a coin.
- ▶ Exchange may offer various denominations for coins.
- ▶ Wallet may not have exact change!
- ▶ Usability requires ability to pay given sufficient total funds.

Key goals:


- ▶ maintain unlinkability
- ▶ maintain taxability of transactions

Method:

- ▶ Contract can specify to only pay *partial value* of a coin.
- ▶ Exchange allows wallet to obtain *unlinkable change* for remaining coin value.

Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)


1. Create private keys $c, t \pmod{o}$
2. Define $C = cG$
3. Define $T = tG$
4. Compute DH
 $cT = c(tG) = t(cG) = tC$



Strawman solution

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old} :


1. Pick random c_{new} mod o private key
 2. $C_{new} = c_{new}G$ public key
 3. Pick random b_{new}
 4. Compute $f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$, $m < n$.
 5. Transmit $f'_{new} := f_{new}b_{new}^e \pmod n$
- ... and sign request for change with c_{old} .



Strawman solution

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old} :

1. Pick random c_{new} mod o private key
 2. $C_{new} = c_{new}G$ public key
 3. Pick random b_{new}
 4. Compute $f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$, $m < n$.
 5. Transmit $f'_{new} := f_{new}b_{new}^e$ mod n
- ... and sign request for change with c_{old} .




Problem: Owner of C_{new} may differ from owner of C_{old} !




Customer: Transfer key setup (ECDH)

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old} :

1. Let $C_{old} := c_{old}G$ (as before)
2. Create random private transfer key $t \bmod o$
3. Compute $T := tG$
4. Compute $X := c_{old}(tG) = t(c_{old}G) = tC_{old}$
5. Derive c_{new} and b_{new} from X
6. Compute $C_{new} := c_{new}G$
7. Compute $f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$
8. Transmit $f'_{new} := f_{new}b_{new}^e$



Cut-and-Choose





Exchange: Choose!

Exchange sends back random $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ to the customer.

Customer: Reveal


1. If $\gamma = 1$, send t_2, t_3 to exchange
2. If $\gamma = 2$, send t_1, t_3 to exchange
3. If $\gamma = 3$, send t_1, t_2 to exchange

Exchange: Verify ($\gamma = 2$)




Exchange: Blind sign change (RSA)

1. Take $f'_{new,\gamma}$.
2. Compute $s' := f'^d_{new,\gamma} \pmod n$.
3. Send signature s' .



Customer: Unblind change (RSA)


1. Receive s' .
2. Compute $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \pmod n$.



Exchange: Allow linking change


Given C_{old}

return $T_\gamma, s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \pmod n.$



Customer: Link (threat!)

1. Have c_{old} .
2. Obtain T_γ, s from exchange
3. Compute $X_\gamma = c_{old} T_\gamma$
4. Derive $c_{new,\gamma}$ and $b_{new,\gamma}$ from X_γ
5. Unblind $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \pmod n$



Refresh protocol summary

- ▶ Customer asks exchange to convert old coin to new coin
- ▶ Protocol ensures new coins can be recovered from old coin
- ⇒ New coins are owned by the same entity!

Thus, the refresh protocol allows:

- ▶ To give unlinkable change.
- ▶ To give refunds to an anonymous customer.
- ▶ To expire old keys and migrate coins to new ones.
- ▶ To handle protocol aborts.

Transactions via refresh are equivalent to sharing a wallet.

Competitor comparison

	Cash	Bitcoin	Zerocoin	Creditcard	GNU Taler
Online	---	++	++	+	+++
Offline	+++	--	--	+	--
Trans. cost	+	----	----	-	++
Speed	+	----	----	o	++
Taxation	-	--	----	+++	+++
Payer-anon	++	o	++	----	+++
Payee-anon	++	o	++	----	----
Security	-	o	o	--	++
Conversion	+++	----	----	+++	+++
Libre	-	+++	+++	---	+++

Conclusion

What can we do?

- ▶ Suffer mass-surveillance enabled by credit card oligopolies with high fees, and
- ▶ Engage in arms race with deliberately unregulatable blockchains, and
- ▶ Enjoy the “benefits” of cash



OR

- ▶ Establish free software alternative balancing social goals!

Do you have any questions?

References:

1. Christian Grothoff, Bart Polot and Carlo von Loesch. *The Internet is broken: Idealistic Ideas for Building a GNU Network*. **W3C/IAB Workshop on Strengthening the Internet Against Pervasive Monitoring (STRINT)**, 2014.
2. Jeffrey Burdges, Florian Dold, Christian Grothoff and Marcello Stanisci. *Enabling Secure Web Payments with GNU Taler*. **SPACE 2016**.
3. Florian Dold, Sree Harsha Totakura, Benedikt Müller, Jeffrey Burdges and Christian Grothoff. *Taler: Taxable Anonymous Libre Electronic Reserves*. Available upon request. 2016.
4. Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Ian Miers, Eran Tromer and Madars Virza. *Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin*. **IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, 2016**.
5. David Chaum, Amos Fiat and Moni Naor. *Untraceable electronic cash*. **Proceedings on Advances in Cryptology, 1990**.
6. Phillip Rogaway. *The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work*. **Asiacrypt, 2015**.

Let money facilitate trade; but ensure capital serves society.