From 2b27d4ca8be9d8228f4dbf52c4d59be9a91b6bbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 04:16:00 +0200
Subject: remove bogus warnings

---
 src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_deposit.c  | 4 ++--
 src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refund.c   | 1 -
 src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_withdraw.c | 7 +++----
 src/lib/exchange_api_handle.c                | 3 ---
 src/testing/testing_api_cmd_recoup.c         | 4 ++++
 src/testing/testing_api_cmd_status.c         | 6 ++----
 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_deposit.c b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_deposit.c
index 4df2c32cd..3ce46b2c9 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_deposit.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_deposit.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ deposit_transaction (void *cls,
     if (0 < TALER_amount_cmp (&spent,
                               &dc->value))
     {
-      GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+      GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
                   "Deposited coin has insufficient funds left!\n");
       *mhd_ret = TEH_RESPONSE_reply_coin_insufficient_funds (connection,
                                                              TALER_EC_DEPOSIT_INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS,
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ TEH_handler_deposit (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
                                                   &hc);
     if (NULL == dki)
     {
-      TALER_LOG_WARNING ("Unknown denomination key in /deposit request\n");
+      TALER_LOG_DEBUG ("Unknown denomination key in /deposit request\n");
       TEH_KS_release (key_state);
       GNUNET_JSON_parse_free (spec);
       return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (connection,
diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refund.c b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refund.c
index e590703af..0a9eede5f 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refund.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refund.c
@@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ refund_transaction (void *cls,
              (tlp->details.refund->rtransaction_id !=
               refund->details.rtransaction_id) )
         {
-          GNUNET_break_op (0); /* conflicting refund found */
           refund_found = GNUNET_SYSERR;
           /* NOTE: Alternatively we could total up all existing
              refunds and check if the sum still permits the
diff --git a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_withdraw.c b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_withdraw.c
index 5665f24fb..bbd926a5c 100644
--- a/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_withdraw.c
+++ b/src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_withdraw.c
@@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ withdraw_transaction (void *cls,
 
     /* The reserve does not have the required amount (actual
      * amount + withdraw fee) */
-    GNUNET_break_op (0);
 #if GNUNET_EXTRA_LOGGING
     {
       char *amount_required;
@@ -258,9 +257,9 @@ withdraw_transaction (void *cls,
 
       amount_required = TALER_amount_to_string (&wc->amount_required);
       r_balance = TALER_amount_to_string (&r.balance);
-      TALER_LOG_WARNING ("Asked %s over a reserve worth %s\n",
-                         amount_required,
-                         r_balance);
+      TALER_LOG_DEBUG ("Asked %s over a reserve worth %s\n",
+                       amount_required,
+                       r_balance);
       GNUNET_free (amount_required);
       GNUNET_free (r_balance);
     }
diff --git a/src/lib/exchange_api_handle.c b/src/lib/exchange_api_handle.c
index a9d28a6a1..224897524 100644
--- a/src/lib/exchange_api_handle.c
+++ b/src/lib/exchange_api_handle.c
@@ -955,9 +955,6 @@ decode_keys_json (const json_t *resp_obj,
       {
         /* 0:0:0 did not support /keys cherry picking */
         TALER_LOG_DEBUG ("Skipping denomination key: already know it\n");
-        /* Okay, but why breaking here? It could be that the
-         * user redownloaded all the keys in a forced way. */
-        GNUNET_break_op (0 == current);
         GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_free (dk.key.rsa_public_key);
         continue;
       }
diff --git a/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_recoup.c b/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_recoup.c
index 836ff717a..3bbda8e75 100644
--- a/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_recoup.c
+++ b/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_recoup.c
@@ -250,6 +250,10 @@ recoup_cb (void *cls,
       /* ps->reserve_history.details.recoup_details.coin_pub; // initialized earlier */
     }
     break;
+  case MHD_HTTP_NOT_FOUND:
+    break;
+  case MHD_HTTP_CONFLICT:
+    break;
   default:
     GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
                 "Unmanaged HTTP status code %u.\n",
diff --git a/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_status.c b/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_status.c
index 71714d3ff..bd93fe9b3 100644
--- a/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_status.c
+++ b/src/testing/testing_api_cmd_status.c
@@ -206,10 +206,8 @@ analyze_command (const struct TALER_ReservePublicKeyP *reserve_pub,
                                                  0,
                                                  &he))
     {
-      /* NOTE: good for debugging for now, might later reduce debug
-         level in case there are commands that legitimately don't
-         impact the reserve history but have the public key trait */
-      GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
+      /* NOTE: only for debugging... */
+      GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
                   "Command `%s' has the reserve_pub trait, but does not reserve history trait\n",
                   cmd->label);
       return GNUNET_OK; /* command does nothing for reserves */
-- 
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