diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/auditor/taler-auditor.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/auditor/taler-auditor.c | 81 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/auditor/taler-auditor.c b/src/auditor/taler-auditor.c index 3e0c7f738..0563ff70d 100644 --- a/src/auditor/taler-auditor.c +++ b/src/auditor/taler-auditor.c @@ -34,14 +34,12 @@ * this eventually anyway! * * KNOWN BUGS: - * - we also seem to nowhere check the denomination signatures over the coins - * (While as the exchange could easily falsify those, we should - * probably check as otherwise insider *without* RSA private key - * access could still create false paybacks to drain exchange funds!) - * => See FIXME42 for last place (likely) missing! * - error handling if denomination keys are used that are not known to the * auditor is, eh, awful / non-existent. We just throw the DB's constraint * violation back at the user. Great UX. + * + * UNDECIDED: + * - do we care about checking the 'done' flag in deposit_cb? */ #include "platform.h" #include <gnunet/gnunet_util_lib.h> @@ -3513,6 +3511,55 @@ reveal_data_cb (void *cls, /** + * Check that the @a coin_pub is a known coin with a proper + * signature for denominatinon @a denom_pub. If not, report + * a loss of @a loss_potential. + * + * @param coin_pub public key of a coin + * @param denom_pub expected denomination of the coin + * @return database transaction status, on success + * #GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SUCCESS_ONE_RESULT + */ +static enum GNUNET_DB_QueryStatus +check_known_coin (const struct TALER_CoinSpendPublicKeyP *coin_pub, + const struct TALER_DenominationPublicKey *denom_pub, + const struct TALER_Amount *loss_potential) +{ + struct TALER_CoinPublicInfo ci; + enum GNUNET_DB_QueryStatus qs; + + GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG, + "Checking denomination signature on %s\n", + TALER_B2S (coin_pub)); + qs = edb->get_known_coin (edb->cls, + esession, + coin_pub, + &ci); + if (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SUCCESS_ONE_RESULT != qs) + { + GNUNET_break (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SOFT_ERROR == qs); + return qs; + } + if (GNUNET_YES != + TALER_test_coin_valid (&ci, + denom_pub)) + { + report (report_bad_sig_losses, + json_pack ("{s:s, s:I, s:o, s:o}", + "operation", "known-coin", + "row", (json_int_t) -1, + "loss", TALER_JSON_from_amount (loss_potential), + "key_pub", GNUNET_JSON_from_data_auto (coin_pub))); + GNUNET_break (GNUNET_OK == + TALER_amount_add (&total_bad_sig_loss, + &total_bad_sig_loss, + loss_potential)); + } + return qs; +} + + +/** * Function called with details about coins that were melted, with the * goal of auditing the refresh's execution. Verifies the signature * and updates our information about coins outstanding (the old coin's @@ -3559,9 +3606,15 @@ refresh_session_cb (void *cls, cc->qs = qs; return GNUNET_SYSERR; } - // FIXME42: should verify that the - // coin was properly signed via TALER_test_coin_valid() here! - // (but would need more information from DB to do so!) + if (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SUCCESS_ONE_RESULT != + check_known_coin (coin_pub, + denom_pub, + amount_with_fee)) + { + GNUNET_break (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SOFT_ERROR == qs); + cc->qs = qs; + return GNUNET_SYSERR; + } /* verify melt signature */ rmc.purpose.purpose = htonl (TALER_SIGNATURE_WALLET_COIN_MELT); @@ -3904,9 +3957,15 @@ deposit_cb (void *cls, cc->qs = qs; return GNUNET_SYSERR; } - // FIXME42: should verify that the - // coin was properly signed via TALER_test_coin_valid() here! - // (but may need more information from DB to do so!) + if (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SUCCESS_ONE_RESULT != + check_known_coin (coin_pub, + denom_pub, + amount_with_fee)) + { + GNUNET_break (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SOFT_ERROR == qs); + cc->qs = qs; + return GNUNET_SYSERR; + } /* Verify deposit signature */ dr.purpose.purpose = htonl (TALER_SIGNATURE_WALLET_COIN_DEPOSIT); |