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-rw-r--r--doc/system/taler/security.tex4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/doc/system/taler/security.tex b/doc/system/taler/security.tex
index 99c8e0520..cf0128a0c 100644
--- a/doc/system/taler/security.tex
+++ b/doc/system/taler/security.tex
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ Taler. Similar to \cite{bellare2006code} we assume that the game and adversary
terminate in finite time, and thus random choices made by the challenger and
adversary can be taken from a finite sample space.
-All games except income transpacency return $1$ to indicate that the adversary
+All games except income transparency return $1$ to indicate that the adversary
has won and $0$ to indicate that the adversary has lost. The income
transparency game returns $0$ if the adversary has lost, and a positive
``laundering ratio'' if the adversary won.
@@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ In particular, the following features are left out of the formal discussion:
behalf of the merchant to obtain proof of their on-time payment, which can
be used in a later arbitration if necessary. Alternatively, the customer
can ask the exchange to undo the partial payments, though this requires the
- exchange to know (or learn from the customer) the exact amount to be payed
+ exchange to know (or learn from the customer) the exact amount to be paid
for the contract.
%A complication in practice is that merchants may not want to reveal their