1 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/doc/cs/content/4_2_specification.tex b/doc/cs/content/4_2_specification.tex
index efe6a3c3d..bfbe5edc7 100644
--- a/doc/cs/content/4_2_specification.tex
+++ b/doc/cs/content/4_2_specification.tex
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ Further, the API ensures that a caller must generate two secret $r$ as in the Cl
   * To ensure unpredictability a new nonce should be used when a new r needs to be derived.
   * Uses HKDF internally.
   * Comment: Can be done in one HKDF shot and split output.
-  * 
+  *
   * @param nonce is a random nonce
   * @param lts is a long-term-secret in form of a private key
   * @param[out] r array containing derived secrets r0 and r1
@@ -265,8 +265,8 @@ Further, the API ensures that a caller must generate two secret $r$ as in the Cl
  GNUNET_CRYPTO_cs_r_derive (const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_CsNonce *nonce,
                             const struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_CsPrivateKey *lts,
                             struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_CsRSecret r[2]);
- 
- 
+
+
 /**
   * Extract the public R of the given secret r.
   *
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ The blinding secrets are generated by a client who provides a secret as seed to
  * To provide abort-idempotency, blinding factors need to be derived but still need to be UNPREDICTABLE
  * To ensure unpredictability a new nonce has to be used.
  * Uses HKDF internally
- * 
+ *
  * @param secret is secret to derive blinding factors
  * @param secret_len secret length
  * @param[out] bs array containing the two derivedGNUNET_CRYPTO_CsBlindingSecret
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ Further the Clause Blind Schnorr API provides an API to calculate the two blinde
 /**
  * Calculate two blinded c's
  * Comment: One would be insecure due to Wagner's algorithm solving ROS
- * 
+ *
  * @param bs array of the two blinding factor structs each containing alpha and beta
  * @param r_pub array of the two signer's nonce R
  * @param pub the public key of the signer
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ See listing \ref{lst:crypto-sign-api}.
  * To ensure unpredictability a new nonce has to be used for every signature
  * HKDF is used internally for derivation
  * r0 and r1 can be derived prior by using GNUNET_CRYPTO_cs_r_derive
- * 
+ *
  * @param priv private key to use for the signing and as LTS in HKDF
  * @param r array of the two secret nonce from the signer
  * @param c array of the two blinded c to sign c_b
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ GNUNET_CRYPTO_cs_unblind (
     struct GNUNET_CRYPTO_CsS *signature_scalar);
 \end{lstlisting}
 
-The verify API takes the message and its signature with the public key and returns GNUNET\_OK for a valid signature and GNUNET\_SYSERR otherwhise.
+The verify API takes the message and its signature with the public key and returns GNUNET\_OK for a valid signature and GNUNET\_SYSERR otherwise.
 See listing \ref{lst:crypto-verify-api}.
 
 \begin{lstlisting}[style=bfh-c,language=C,, caption={GNUnet verify API}, label={lst:crypto-verify-api}]
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ In crypto.c many utility functions are provided to create planchets (for planche
 One difference between \gls{RSABS} and \gls{CSBS} is, that the coin private key and RSA blinding secret can be created at the same point in time, since the RSA blinding secret is created randomly.
 However, for Clause Blind Schnorr secrets an additional step is needed, the public $R_0$ and $R_1$ are required to calculate the blinding seed to derive the secrets.
 
-A planchet in the Clause Blind Schnorr Signature Scheme can be created as followed (implementation details ommited).
+A planchet in the Clause Blind Schnorr Signature Scheme can be created as followed (implementation details omitted).
 
 \begin{enumerate}
   \item Create planchet with new \ac{EdDSA} private key
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ The exchange offline signer requests the future, not yet signed keys by calling
       master\_pub & Exchange's master public key \\
       denom\_secmod\_public\_key & RSA security module public key \\
       denom\_secmod\_cs\_public\_key & \gls{CSBS} security module public key \\
-      signkey\_secmod\_public\_key & Online singing security module public key \\
+      signkey\_secmod\_public\_key & Online signing security module public key \\
   \end{tabular}
   \caption{GET \url{/management/keys} response data}
   \label{tab:management-keys-get}