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authorSree Harsha Totakura <sreeharsha@totakura.in>2015-10-26 11:49:08 +0100
committerSree Harsha Totakura <sreeharsha@totakura.in>2015-10-26 11:49:08 +0100
commit5ff88d055e5b2ca1dfa166887f8aeb94574d3ef7 (patch)
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fix notation is refreshing protocol
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r--doc/paper/taler.tex10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/doc/paper/taler.tex b/doc/paper/taler.tex
index 7d3c4e33e..69c2ad40c 100644
--- a/doc/paper/taler.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/taler.tex
@@ -826,14 +826,14 @@ generator of the elliptic curve.
where $K_i := H(c'_s T_p^{(i)})$, and
commits $\langle C', \vec{T}, \vec{C}, \vec{b} \rangle$ to disk.
- Our computation of $K_i$ is a effectively a Diffie-Hellman operation
+ Our computation of $K_i$ is effectively a Diffie-Hellman operation
between the private key $c'_s$ of the original coin with
- the public transfer key $T_p^{(i)}_p$.
+ the public transfer key $T_p^{(i)}$.
\item The customer computes $B^{(i)} := B_{b^{(i)}}(C^{(i)}_p)$ for $i \in \{1,\ldots,\kappa\}$ and sends a commitment
- $S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T_p}))$ to the mint.
+ $S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T_p})$ to the mint.
\item The mint generates a random $\gamma$ with $1 \le \gamma \le \kappa$ and
marks $C'_p$ as spent by committing
- $\langle C', \gamma, S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T}) \rangle$ to disk.
+ $\langle C', \gamma, S_{C'}(\vec{E}, \vec{B}, \vec{T_p}) \rangle$ to disk.
Auditing processes should assure that $\gamma$ is unpredictable until
this time to prevent the mint from assisting tax evasion.
\item The mint sends $S_{K'}(C'_p, \gamma)$ to the customer where
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ request $S_{C'}(\mathtt{link})$ with $(T^{(\gamma)}_p$, $E^{(\gamma)},
%
This allows the owner of the melted coin to also obtain the private
key of the new coin, even if the refreshing protocol was illicitly
-executed with the help of another party who generated $C_s$ and only
+executed with the help of another party who generated $\vec{c_s}$ and only
provided $\vec{C_p}$ and other required information to the old owner.
As a result, linking ensures that access to the new coins minted by
the refresh protocol is always {\em shared} with the owner of the