.. This file is part of GNU TALER. Copyright (C) 2014, 2015, 2016 INRIA TALER is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1, or (at your option) any later version. TALER is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License along with TALER; see the file COPYING. If not, see @author Marcello Stanisci ================================== Example: Essay Store ================================== .. The main page of the essay store shows links to essays of the form `/essay?name=:name`. The `/essay` URL takes the following query parameters: * `name`: mandatory, name of the essay * `tid`: optional, transaction ID generated by the merchant for the contract that was used to purchase an instance of the article * `timestamp`, optional, timestamp for the contract that was used to purchase the essay with the given `tid`. These are the steps for showing `/essay`. If the wallet is not present in steps 2 and 3, the user agent is redirected to a mock credit card payment page. 1. The server checks the status of the the essay with the name `name` in the server-side session state * If the essay is marked as payed, display the essay. * Otherwise proceed with step 2 2. The server checks if the `tid` and `timestamp` query parameters are present * If `tid` and `timestamp` are present, restore the contract for the essay (using `tid` as transaction id in the contract, `timestamp` as timestamp and `timestamp+REFUND_DELTA` as refund deadline) and emit the `taler-execute-contract` DOM event in the user agent. * Otherwise proceed with step 3 3. The server generates a new contract and emits the `taler-confirm-contract` DOM event in the user agent, with the essay name as repurchase correlation identifier and `/essay?name=:name?tid=:tid` as fulfillment url. In step 2, the `taler-execute-contract` event has the following parameters: * `H_contract`: hash of the contract that was restored * `payment_url`: The internal URL `/pay?H_contract=...` of the essay store, will set the server-side session state for the article associated with the contract hash on successful coin deposit. The contract hash is associated with the article name in the server-side session state when the contract is restored. * `offer_url`: Link to a teaser page (`/teaser?name=...`), which also contains a link to the article page, without the `tid` parameter. Note that we assume that all essays cost the same (otherwise the amount would have to be included in the restoration information in the /essay fulfillment URL). The refund deadline is computed by adding the merchant-specific constant `REFUND_DELTA` to the contract's timestamp. .. Describing implementation of the above scenario -------------- Before reading -------------- To properly understand this example, the reader should be familiar with Taler's terminology; in particular, definitions like `contract`, `fulfillment URL`, `offering URL`, `IIG` and `deposit permission`, are assumed to be known. Refer to :ref:`contract`, :ref:`payprot` and :ref:`deposit` in order to get some general insight on terms and interactions between components. This section describes how the demonstrator essay store interacts with the Taler system. As for Taler's terminology, the demonstrator essay store is an example of `frontend`. This demonstrator lies in `examples/blog` of `git://taler.net/merchant/examples/blog` The essay store, available at https://blog.demo.taler.net, is such that its homepage is a list of buyable articles and each article is a reference to an `offering URL` (see :ref:`offer`). In particular, this offering URL has the following format: `https://blog.demo.taler.net/essay_fulfillment.php?article=articleId` It is worth noting that in our implementation the `offering` and the `fulfillment` URLs differ only respect to the parameters given to the path `/essay_fulfillment.php`. Namely, the offering URL becomes a fulfillment URL whenever the user adds the parameters needed to reconstruct the contract, which are `tid` (transaction id) and `timestamp` (see :ref:`contract`, and :ref:`ffil`). For the sake of completeness, `https://blog.demo.taler.net/essay_fulfillment.php?article=articleId&tid=3489×tamp=8374738` would be a fulfillment URL. Once the user visits the offering URL by clicking on some article's title, the merchant 1. checks if the state associated to this article corresponds to "payed". If this is the case, point 7. is triggered, which is what happens when point 0 of :ref:`offer` is true. 2. checks if the user gave additional parameters to the URL above, actually making it a fulfillment URL. If so, jump to point `y`. 3. returns a page which can detect if a Taler wallet is installed in the user's browser and, if so, automatically downloads the contract from the merchant; if not, displays a paywall for credit card payment. Note that the contract's request is entirely managed by the page's JavaScript and not by the wallet; that gives more flexibility to the merchants by reducing the communication between wallets and shops. The wallet gets involved once the contract arrives and the JavaScript fires a `taler-confirm-contract` event containing the contract, see point 1. of :ref:`offer`. 4. the wallet visits the fulfillment URL associated with this purchase (the fulfillment URL's path is indicated in the contract, so the wallet has to just add `tid` and `timestamp` to it). 5. the same script as in point 1. gets executed, but this time it detects that the user is visiting a fulfillment URL. The script can now reconstruct the contract and store its hash in the state. The hash is stored in an associative array having resource names as keys; in this case the key `articleId` points to the contract's hash. This way is easier to detect if a resource which is to be payed is actually mentioned in the deposit permission. Without this control, a malicious wallet can send a deposit permission for `articleA` and get the resource `articleB`, see point 6. As a last step, the script returns a page which fires a `taler-execute-payment` event in the user's browser carrying the same data structure as in point 4. of :ref:`offer`. Note that both in point 3. and 5. the HTML page returned is the same, namely it is the page showing the credit card payment. It is designed so that it is possible to `inject` the event to fire at the user's browser. So in point 3. the injected event is `taler-confirm-contract`, and in point 5. is `taler-execute-payment`. This way if the Taler wallet responds to the event, then the payment is kept Taler-style, otherwise the user just sees a credit card form (without making further requests). 6. the wallet POSTs the deposit permission to `pay_url`, which is `https://blog.demo.taler.net/essay_pay.php?article=articleId` This step is responsible for setting the state for `articleId` as payed; to that end it uses `articleId` as the key to get `H_contract` from the state and checks if `H_contract` equals the contract's hash contained in the deposit permission. If they are equal, then the deposit permission is forwarded to the backend. If the backend return a HTTP status 200, then `essay_pay.php` sets the state for `articleId` as payed and notify the wallet about the payment's outcome. If the backend reports any problem, `essay_pay.php` will just forward the data gotten from the backend to the wallet, which will be in charge of managing the error. 7. the wallet visit the fulfillment URL, but now the state for `articleId` is set to payed, so the script will just show the wanted article. `https://blog.demo.taler.net/essay_fulfillment.php?article=articleId&tid=3489×tamp=8374738` ---------------------- IIG by fulfillment URL ---------------------- TBD