..
This file is part of Anastasis
Copyright (C) 2019. 2021 Anastasis SARL
Anastasis is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software
Foundation; either version 2.1, or (at your option) any later version.
Anastasis is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License along with
Anastasis; see the file COPYING. If not, see
@author Christian Grothoff
@author Dominik Meister
@author Dennis Neufeld
=========
Anastasis
=========
Anastasis is a service that allows the user to securely deposit a
**core secret** with an open set of escrow providers and recover it if the secret is
lost. The **core secret** itself is protected from the escrow providers by
encrypting it with a **master key**. The main objective of Anastasis is to
ensure that the user can reliably recover the **core secret**, while making
this difficult for everyone else. Furthermore, it is assumed that the user is
unable to reliably remember any secret with sufficiently high entropy, so we
cannot simply encrypt using some other key material in possession of the user.
To uniquely identify users, an "unforgettable" **identifier** is used. This
identifier should be difficult to guess for anybody but the user. However, the
**identifier** is not expected to have sufficient entropy or secrecy to be
cryptographically secure. Examples for such identifier would be a
concatenation of the full name of the user and their social security or
passport number(s). For Swiss citizens, the AHV number could also be used.
The adversary model of Anastasis has two types of adversaries: weak
adversaries which do not know the user's **identifier**, and strong
adversaries which somehow do know a user's **identifier**. For weak
adversaries the system guarantees full confidentiality. For strong
adversaries, breaking confidentiality additionally requires that Anastasis
escrow providers must have colluded. The user is able to specify a set of
**policies** which determine which Anastasis escrow providers would need to
collude to break confidentiality. These policies also set the bar for the user
to recover their core secret.
A **recovery document** includes all of the information a user needs to
recover access to their core secret. It specifies a set of **escrow
methods**, which specify how the user should convince the Anastasis server
that they are "real". Escrow methods can for example include SMS-based
verification, video identification or a security question. For each escrow
method, the Anastasis server is provided with **truth**, that is data the
Anastasis operator may learn during the recovery process to authenticate the
user. Examples for truth would be a phone number (for SMS), a picture of the
user (for video identification), or the (hash of) a security answer. A strong
adversary is assumed to be able to learn the truth, while weak adversaries
must not. In addition to a set of escrow methods and associated Anastasis
server operators, the **recovery document** also specifies **policies**, which
describe the combination(s) of the escrow methods that suffice to obtain
access to the core secret. For example, a **policy** could say that the
escrow methods (A and B) suffice, and a second policy may permit (A and C). A
different user may choose to use the policy that (A and B and C) are all
required. Anastasis imposes no limit on the number of policies in a
**recovery document**, or the set of providers or escrow methods involved in
guarding a user's secret. Weak adversaries must not be able to deduce
information about a user's **recovery document** (except for its length, which
may be exposed to an adversary which monitors the user's network traffic).
-------------------
Anastasis DB Schema
-------------------
.. image:: anastasis-db.png
.. image:: anastasis_challengecode.png
.. image:: anastasis_challenge_payment.png
.. image:: anastasis_truth.png
.. image:: anastasis_truth_payment.png
----------------------
Anastasis Cryptography
----------------------
When a user needs to interact with Anastasis, the system first derives some key
material, but not the master secret, from the user's **identifier** using
different HKDFs. These HKDFs are salted using the respective escrow
provider's **server salt**, which ensures that the accounts for the same user
cannot be easily correlated across the various Anastasis servers.
Each Anastasis server uses an EdDSA **account key** to identify the account of
the user. The account private key is derived from the user's **identifier** using
a computationally expensive cryptographic hash function. Using an
expensive hash algorithm is assumed to make it infeasible for a weak adversary to
determine account keys by brute force (without knowing the user's identifier).
However, it is assumed that a strong adversary performing a targeted attack can
compute the account key pair.
The public account key is Crockford base32-encoded in the URI to identify the
account, and used to sign requests. These signatures are also provided in
base32-encoding and transmitted using the HTTP header
``Anastasis-Account-Signature``.
When confidential data is uploaded to an Anastasis server, the respective
payload is encrypted using AES-GCM with a symmetric key and initialization
vector derived from the **identifier** and a high-entropy **nonce**. The
nonce and the GCM tag are prepended to the ciphertext before being uploaded to
the Anastasis server. This is done whenever confidential data is stored with
the server.
The **core secret** of the user is (AES) encrypted using a symmetric **master
key**. Recovering this master key requires the user to satisfy a particular
**policy**. Policies specify a set of **escrow methods**, each of which leads
the user to a **key share**. Combining those key shares (by hashing) allows
the user to obtain a **policy key**, which can be used to decrypt the **master
key**. There can be many policies, satisfying any of these will allow the
user to recover the master key. A **recovery document** contains the
encrypted **core secret**, a set of escrow methods and a set of policies.
Key derivations
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
EdDSA and ECDHE public keys are always points on Curve25519 and represented
using the standard 256 bit Ed25519 compact format. The binary representation
is converted to Crockford Base32 when transmitted inside JSON or as part of
URLs.
To start, a user provides their private, unique and unforgettable
**identifier** as a seed to identify their account. For example, this could
be a social security number together with their full name. Specifics may
depend on the cultural context, in this document we will simply refer to this
information as the **identifier**.
This identifier will be first hashed with Argon2, to provide a **kdf_id**
which will be used to derive other keys later. The Hash must also include the
respective **server_salt**. This also ensures that the **kdf_id** is different
on each server. The use of Argon2 and the respective **server_salt** is intended
to make it difficult to brute-force **kdf_id** values and help protect the user's
privacy. Also this ensures that the **kdf_id**\ s on every server differs. However,
we do not assume that the **identifier** or the **kdf_id** cannot be
determined by an adversary performing a targeted attack, as a user's
**identifier** is likely to always be known to state actors and may
likely also be available to other actors.
.. code-block:: none
kdf_id := Argon2( identifier, server_salt, keysize )
**identifier**: The secret defined from the user beforehand.
**server_salt**: The salt from the Server.
**keysize**: The desired output size of the KDF, here 32 bytes.
Verification
------------
For users to authorize "policy" operations we need an EdDSA key pair. As we
cannot assure that the corresponding private key is truly secret, such policy
operations must never be destructive: Should an adversary learn the private
key, they could access (and with the **kdf_id**, decrypt) the user's policy (but
not the core secret), or upload a new version of the
**encrypted recovery document** (but not delete an existing version).
For the generation of the private key we use the **kdf_id** as the entropy source,
hash it to derive a base secret which will then be processed to fit the
requirements for EdDSA private keys. From the private key we can then
generate the corresponding public key. Here, "ver" is used as a salt for the
HKDF to ensure that the result differs from other cases where we hash
**kdf_id**.
.. code-block:: none
ver_secret := HKDF(kdf_id, "ver", keysize)
eddsa_priv := eddsa_d_to_a(ver_secret)
eddsa_pub := get_EdDSA_Pub(eddsa_priv)
**HKDF()**: The HKDF-function uses two phases: First we use HMAC-SHA512 for the extraction phase, then HMAC-SHA256 is used for expansion phase.
**kdf_id**: Hashed identifier.
**key_size**: Size of the output, here 32 bytes.
**ver_secret**: Derived key from the ``kdf_id``, serves as intermediate step for the generation of the private key.
**eddsa_d_to_a()**: Function which converts the ver_key to a valid EdDSA private key. Specifically, assuming the value ``eddsa_priv`` is in a 32-byte array "digest", the function clears and sets certain bits as follows:
.. code-block:: c
digest[0] = (digest[0] & 0x7f) | 0x40;
digest[31] &= 0xf8;
**eddsa_priv**: The generated EdDSA private key.
**eddsa_pub**: The generated EdDSA public key.
Encryption
----------
For symmetric encryption of data we use AES256-GCM. For this we need a
symmetric key and an initialization vector (IV). To ensure that the
symmetric key changes for each encryption operation, we compute the
key material using an HKDF over a ``nonce`` and the ``kdf_id``.
.. code-block:: none
(iv,key) := HKDF(kdf_id, nonce, keysize + ivsize)
**HKDF()**: The HKDF-function uses two phases: First we use HMAC-SHA512 for the extraction phase, then HMAC-SHA256 is used for expansion phase.
**kdf_id**: Hashed identifier.
**keysize**: Size of the AES symmetric key, here 32 bytes.
**ivsize**: Size of the AES GCM IV, here 12 bytes.
**prekey**: Original key material.
**nonce**: 32-byte nonce, must never match "ver" (which it cannot as the length is different). Of course, we must
avoid key reuse. So, we have to use different nonces to get different keys and IVs (see below).
**key**: Symmetric key which is later used to encrypt the documents with AES256-GCM.
**iv**: IV which will be used for AES-GCM.
Key Usage
^^^^^^^^^
The keys we have generated are then used to encrypt the **recovery document** and
the **key_share** of the user.
Encryption
----------
Before every encryption a 32-byte nonce is generated.
From this the symmetric key is computed as described above.
We use AES256-GCM for the encryption of the **recovery document** and
the **key_share**. To ensure that the key derivation for the encryption
of the **recovery document** differs fundamentally from that of an
individual **key share**, we use different salts ("erd" and "eks", respectively).
.. code-block:: none
(iv0, key0) := HKDF(key_id, nonce0, "erd", keysize + ivsize)
(encrypted_recovery_document, aes_gcm_tag) := AES256_GCM(recovery_document, key0, iv0)
(iv_i, key_i) := HKDF(key_id, nonce_i, "eks", [optional data], keysize + ivsize)
(encrypted_key_share_i, aes_gcm_tag_i) := AES256_GCM(key_share_i, key_i, iv_i)
**encrypted_recovery_document**: The encrypted **recovery document** which contains the escrow methods, policies
and the encrypted **core secret**.
**nonce0**: Nonce which is used to generate *key0* and *iv0* which are used for the encryption of the *recovery document*.
Nonce must contain the string "ERD".
**optional data**: Key material that optionally is contributed from the authentication method to further obfuscate the key share from the escrow provider.
**encrypted_key_share_i**: The encrypted **key_share** which the escrow provider must release upon successful authentication.
Here, **i** must be a positive number used to iterate over the various **key shares** used for the various **escrow methods**
at the various providers.
**nonce_i**: Nonce which is used to generate *key_i* and *iv_i* which are used for the encryption of the **key share**. **i** must be
the same number as specified above for *encrypted_key_share_i*. Nonce must contain the string "EKS" plus the according *i*.
As a special rule, when a **security question** is used to authorize access to an
**encrypted_key_share_i**, then the salt "eks" is replaced with an (expensive) hash
of the answer to the security question as an additional way to make the key share
inaccessible to those who do not have the answer:
.. code-block:: none
powh := POW_HASH (qsalt, answer)
ekss := HKDF("Anastasis-secure-question-uuid-salting",
powh,
uuid);
(iv_i, key_i) := HKDF(key_id, nonce_i, ekss, [optional data], keysize + ivsize)
**qsalt**: Salt value used to hash answer to satisfy the challenge to prevent the provider from determining the answer via guessing.
**answer**: Answer to the security question, in UTF-8, as entered by the user.
**powh**: Result of the (expensive, proof-of-work) hash algorithm.
**uuid**: UUID of the challenge associated with the security question and the encrypted key share.
**ekss**: Replacement salt to be used instead of "eks" when deriving the key to encrypt/decrypt the key share.
Signatures
----------
The EdDSA keys are used to sign the data sent from the client to the
server. Everything the client sends to server is signed. The following
algorithm is equivalent for **Anastasis-Policy-Signature**.
.. code-block:: none
(anastasis-account-signature) := eddsa_sign(h_body, eddsa_priv)
ver_res := eddsa_verifiy(h_body, anastasis-account-signature, eddsa_pub)
**anastasis-account-signature**: Signature over the SHA-512 hash of the body using the purpose code ``TALER_SIGNATURE_ANASTASIS_POLICY_UPLOAD`` (1400) (see GNUnet EdDSA signature API for the use of purpose).
**h_body**: The hashed body.
**ver_res**: A boolean value. True: Signature verification passed, False: Signature verification failed.
When requesting policy downloads, the client must also provide a signature:
.. code-block:: none
(anastasis-account-signature) := eddsa_sign(version, eddsa_priv)
ver_res := eddsa_verifiy(version, anastasis-account-signature, eddsa_pub)
**anastasis-account-signature**: Signature over the SHA-512 hash of the body using the purpose code ``TALER_SIGNATURE_ANASTASIS_POLICY_DOWNLOAD`` (1401) (see GNUnet EdDSA signature API for the use of purpose).
**version**: The version requested as a 64-bit integer, 2^64-1 for the "latest version".
**ver_res**: A boolean value. True: Signature verification passed, False: Signature verification failed.
Availability Considerations
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Anastasis considers two main threats against availability. First, the
Anastasis server operators must be protected against denial-of-service attacks
where an adversary attempts to exhaust the operator's resources. The API protects
against these attacks by allowing operators to set fees for all
operations. Furthermore, all data stored comes with an expiration logic, so an
attacker cannot force servers to store data indefinitely.
A second availability issue arises from strong adversaries that may be able to
compute the account keys of some user. While we assume that such an adversary
cannot successfully authenticate against the truth, the account key does
inherently enable these adversaries to upload a new policy for the account.
This cannot be prevented, as the legitimate user must be able to set or change
a policy using only the account key. To ensure that an adversary cannot
exploit this, policy uploads first of all never delete existing policies, but
merely create another version. This way, even if an adversary uploads a
malicious policy, a user can still retrieve an older version of the policy to
recover access to their data. This append-only storage for policies still
leaves a strong adversary with the option of uploading many policies to
exhaust the Anastasis server's capacity. We limit this attack by requiring a
policy upload to include a reference to a **payment identifier** from a payment
made by the user. Thus, a policy upload requires both knowledge of the
**identity** and making a payment. This effectively prevents an adversary
from using the append-only policy storage from exhausting Anastasis server
capacity.
------------------
Anastasis REST API
------------------
.. _salt:
.. _config:
Receiving Configuration
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.. http:get:: /config
Obtain the configuration details of the escrow provider.
**Response:**
Returns an `EscrowConfigurationResponse`_.
.. _EscrowConfigurationResponse:
.. ts:def:: EscrowConfigurationResponse
interface EscrowConfigurationResponse {
// Protocol identifier, clarifies that this is an Anastasis provider.
name: "anastasis";
// libtool-style representation of the Exchange protocol version, see
// https://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/manual/html_node/Versioning.html#Versioning
// The format is "current:revision:age".
version: string;
// Currency in which this provider processes payments.
currency: string;
// Supported authorization methods.
methods: AuthorizationMethodConfig[];
// Maximum policy upload size supported.
storage_limit_in_megabytes: number;
// Payment required to maintain an account to store policy documents for a year.
// Users can pay more, in which case the storage time will go up proportionally.
annual_fee: Amount;
// Payment required to upload truth. To be paid per upload.
truth_upload_fee: Amount;
// How long until the service expires deposited truth
// (unless refreshed via another POST)?
truth_lifetime: RelativeTime;
// Limit on the liability that the provider is offering with
// respect to the services provided.
liability_limit: Amount;
// Salt value with 128 bits of entropy.
// Different providers
// will use different high-entropy salt values. The resulting
// **provider salt** is then used in various operations to ensure
// cryptographic operations differ by provider. A provider must
// never change its salt value.
server_salt: string;
}
.. _AuthorizationMethodConfig:
.. ts:def:: AuthorizationMethodConfig
interface AuthorizationMethodConfig {
// Name of the authorization method.
type: string;
// Fee for accessing key share using this method.
cost: Amount;
}
.. _terms:
Receiving Terms of Service
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.. http:get:: /terms
Obtain the terms of service provided by the escrow provider.
**Response:**
Returns the terms of service of the provider, in the best language
and format available based on the client's request.
.. http:get:: /privacy
Obtain the privacy policy of the service provided by the escrow provider.
**Response:**
Returns the privacy policy of the provider, in the best language
and format available based on the client's request.
.. _manage-policy:
Manage policy
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This API is used by the Anastasis client to deposit or request encrypted
recovery documents with the escrow provider. Generally, a client will deposit
the same encrypted recovery document with each escrow provider, but provide
a different truth to each escrow provider.
Operations by the client are identified and authorized by ``$ACCOUNT_PUB``, which
should be kept secret from third parties. ``$ACCOUNT_PUB`` should be an account
public key using the Crockford base32-encoding.
In the following, UUID is always defined and used according to `RFC 4122`_.
.. _`RFC 4122`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4122
.. http:get:: /policy/$ACCOUNT_PUB[?version=$NUMBER]
Get the customer's encrypted recovery document. If ``version``
is not specified, the server returns the latest available version. If
``version`` is specified, returns the policy with the respective
``version``. The response must begin with the nonce and
an AES-GCM tag and continue with the ciphertext. Once decrypted, the
plaintext is expected to contain:
* the escrow policy
* the separately encrypted master public key
Note that the key shares required to decrypt the master public key are
not included, as for this the client needs to obtain authorization.
The policy does provide sufficient information for the client to determine
how to authorize requests for **truth**.
The client MAY provide an ``If-None-Match`` header with an Etag.
In that case, the server MUST additionally respond with an ``304`` status
code in case the resource matches the provided Etag.
**Response**:
:http:statuscode:`200 OK`:
The escrow provider responds with an EncryptedRecoveryDocument_ object.
:http:statuscode:`304 Not modified`:
The client requested the same resource it already knows.
:http:statuscode:`400 Bad request`:
The ``$ACCOUNT_PUB`` is not an EdDSA public key.
:http:statuscode:`402 Payment Required`:
The account's balance is too low for the specified operation.
See the Taler payment protocol specification for how to pay.
:http:statuscode:`403 Forbidden`:
The required account signature was invalid.
:http:statuscode:`404 Not found`:
The requested resource was not found.
*Anastasis-Version*: $NUMBER --- The server must return actual version of the encrypted recovery document via this header.
If the client specified a version number in the header of the request, the server must return that version. If the client
did not specify a version in the request, the server returns latest version of the EncryptedRecoveryDocument_.
*Etag*: Set by the server to the Base32-encoded SHA512 hash of the body. Used for caching and to prevent redundancies. The server MUST send the Etag if the status code is ``200 OK``.
*If-None-Match*: If this is not the very first request of the client, this contains the Etag-value which the client has received before from the server.
The client SHOULD send this header with every request (except for the first request) to avoid unnecessary downloads.
*Anastasis-Account-Signature*: The client must provide Base-32 encoded EdDSA signature over hash of body with ``$ACCOUNT_PRIV``, affirming desire to download the requested encrypted recovery document. The purpose used MUST be ``TALER_SIGNATURE_ANASTASIS_POLICY_DOWNLOAD`` (1401).
.. http:post:: /policy/$ACCOUNT_PUB
Upload a new version of the customer's encrypted recovery document.
While the document's structure is described in JSON below, the upload
should just be the bytestream of the raw data (i.e. 32-byte nonce followed
by 16-byte tag followed by the encrypted document).
If the request has been seen before, the server should do nothing, and otherwise store the new version.
The body must begin with a nonce, an AES-GCM tag and continue with the ciphertext. The format
is the same as specified for the response of the GET method. The
Anastasis server cannot fully validate the format, but MAY impose
minimum and maximum size limits.
**Request**:
:query pay:
Optional argument, any non-empty value will do,
suggested is ``y`` for ``yes``.
The client insists on making a payment for the respective
account, even if this is not yet required. The server
will respond with a ``402 Payment required``, but only
if the rest of the request is well-formed (account
signature must match). Clients that do not actually
intend to make a new upload but that only want to pay
may attempt to upload the latest backup again, as this
option will be checked before the ``304 Not modified``
case.
:query timeout_ms=NUMBER: *Optional.* If specified, the Anastasis server will
wait up to ``timeout_ms`` milliseconds for completion of the payment before
sending the HTTP response. A client must never rely on this behavior, as the
backend may return a response immediately.
*If-None-Match*: This header MUST be present and set to the SHA512 hash (Etag) of the body by the client.
The client SHOULD also set the ``Expect: 100-Continue`` header and wait for ``100 continue``
before uploading the body. The server MUST
use the Etag to check whether it already knows the encrypted recovery document that is about to be uploaded.
The server MUST refuse the upload with a ``304`` status code if the Etag matches
the latest version already known to the server.
*Anastasis-Policy-Signature*: The client must provide Base-32 encoded EdDSA signature over hash of body with ``$ACCOUNT_PRIV``, affirming desire to upload an encrypted recovery document.
*Payment-Identifier*: Base-32 encoded 32-byte payment identifier that was included in a previous payment (see ``402`` status code). Used to allow the server to check that the client paid for the upload (to protect the server against DoS attacks) and that the client knows a real secret of financial value (as the **kdf_id** might be known to an attacker). If this header is missing in the client's request (or the associated payment has exceeded the upload limit), the server must return a ``402`` response. When making payments, the server must include a fresh, randomly-generated payment-identifier in the payment request.
**Response**:
:http:statuscode:`204 No content`:
The encrypted recovery document was accepted and stored. ``Anastasis-Version`` and ``Anastasis-UUID`` headers
indicate what version and UUID was assigned to this encrypted recovery document upload by the server.
:http:statuscode:`304 Not modified`:
The same encrypted recovery document was previously accepted and stored. ``Anastasis-Version`` header
indicates what version was previously assigned to this encrypted recovery document.
:http:statuscode:`400 Bad request`:
The ``$ACCOUNT_PUB`` is not an EdDSA public key or mandatory headers are missing.
The response body MUST elaborate on the error using a Taler error code in the typical JSON encoding.
:http:statuscode:`402 Payment required`:
The account's balance is too low for the specified operation.
See the Taler payment protocol specification for how to pay.
The response body MAY provide alternative means for payment.
:http:statuscode:`403 Forbidden`:
The required account signature was invalid. The response body may elaborate on the error.
:http:statuscode:`413 Request entity too large`:
The upload is too large *or* too small. The response body may elaborate on the error.
**Details:**
.. _EncryptedRecoveryDocument:
.. ts:def:: EncryptedRecoveryDocument
interface EncryptedRecoveryDocument {
// Nonce used to compute the (iv,key) pair for encryption of the
// encrypted_compressed_recovery_document.
nonce: [32]; //bytearray
// Authentication tag.
aes_gcm_tag: [16]; //bytearray
// Variable-size encrypted recovery document. After decryption,
// this contains a gzip compressed JSON-encoded `RecoveryDocument`.
// The nonce of the HKDF for this encryption must include the
// string "ERD".
encrypted_compressed_recovery_document: []; //bytearray of undefined length
}
.. _RecoveryDocument:
.. ts:def:: RecoveryDocument
interface RecoveryDocument {
// Account identifier at backup provider, AES-encrypted with
// the (symmetric) master_key, i.e. an URL
// https://sync.taler.net/$BACKUP_ID and
// a private key to decrypt the backup. Anastasis is oblivious
// to the details of how this is ultimately encoded.
backup_account: []; //bytearray of undefined length
// List of escrow providers and selected authentication method.
methods: EscrowMethod[];
// List of possible decryption policies.
policy: DecryptionPolicy[];
}
.. _EscrowMethod:
.. ts:def:: EscrowMethod
interface EscrowMethod {
// URL of the escrow provider (including possibly this Anastasis server).
provider_url : string;
// Type of the escrow method (e.g. security question, SMS etc.).
escrow_type: string;
// UUID of the escrow method (see /truth/ API below).
uuid: string;
// Key used to encrypt the `Truth` this `EscrowMethod` is related to.
// Client has to provide this key to the server when using ``/truth/``.
truth_encryption_key: [32]; //bytearray
// Salt used to encrypt the truth on the Anastasis server.
truth_salt: [32]; //bytearray
// The challenge to give to the user (i.e. the security question
// if this is challenge-response).
// (Q: as string in base32 encoding?)
// (Q: what is the mime-type of this value?)
//
// For some methods, this value may be absent.
//
// The plaintext challenge is not revealed to the
// Anastasis server.
challenge: []; //bytearray of undefined length
}
.. _DecryptionPolicy:
.. ts:def:: DecryptionPolicy
interface DecryptionPolicy {
// Salt included to encrypt master key share when
// using this decryption policy.
policy_salt: [32]; //bytearray
// Master key, AES-encrypted with key derived from
// salt and keyshares revealed by the following list of
// escrow methods identified by UUID.
encrypted_master_key: [32]; //bytearray
// List of escrow methods identified by their UUID.
uuid: string[];
}
.. _Truth:
Managing truth
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This API is used by the Anastasis client to deposit **truth** or request a (encrypted) **key share** with
the escrow provider.
An **escrow method** specifies an Anastasis provider and how the user should
authorize themself. The **truth** API allows the user to provide the
(encrypted) key share to the respective escrow provider, as well as auxiliary
data required for such a respective escrow method.
An Anastasis-server may store truth for free for a certain time period, or
charge per truth operation using GNU Taler.
.. http:post:: /truth/$UUID
Upload a `TruthUploadRequest`_-Object according to the policy the client created before (see `RecoveryDocument`_).
If request has been seen before, the server should do nothing, and otherwise store the new object.
**Request:**
:query timeout_ms=NUMBER: *Optional.* If specified, the Anastasis server will
wait up to ``timeout_ms`` milliseconds for completion of the payment before
sending the HTTP response. A client must never rely on this behavior, as the
backend may return a response immediately.
**Response:**
:http:statuscode:`204 No content`:
Truth stored successfully.
:http:statuscode:`304 Not modified`:
The same truth was previously accepted and stored under this UUID. The
Anastasis server must still update the expiration time for the truth when returning
this response code.
:http:statuscode:`402 Payment required`:
This server requires payment to store truth per item.
See the Taler payment protocol specification for how to pay.
The response body MAY provide alternative means for payment.
:http:statuscode:`409 Conflict`:
The server already has some truth stored under this UUID. The client should check that it
is generating UUIDs with enough entropy.
:http:statuscode:`412 Precondition failed`:
The selected authentication method is not supported on this provider.
**Details:**
.. _TruthUploadRequest:
.. ts:def:: TruthUploadRequest
interface TruthUploadRequest {
// Contains the information of an interface `EncryptedKeyShare`, but simply
// as one binary block (in Crockford Base32 encoding for JSON).
key_share_data: []; //bytearray
// Key share method, i.e. "security question", "SMS", "e-mail", ...
type: string;
// Nonce used to compute the (iv,key) pair for encryption of the
// encrypted_truth.
nonce: [32]; //bytearray
// Authentication tag of ``encrypted_truth``.
aes_gcm_tag: [16]; //bytearray
// Variable-size truth. After decryption,
// this contains the ground truth, i.e. H(challenge answer),
// phone number, e-mail address, picture, fingerprint, ...
// **base32 encoded**.
//
// The nonce of the HKDF for this encryption must include the
// string "ECT".
encrypted_truth: [80]; //bytearray
// MIME type of truth, i.e. text/ascii, image/jpeg, etc.
truth_mime: string;
}
.. http:get:: /truth/$UUID[?response=$H_RESPONSE]
Get the stored encrypted key share. If ``$H_RESPONSE`` is specified by the client, the server checks
if ``$H_RESPONSE`` matches the expected response specified before within the `TruthUploadRequest`_ (see ``encrypted_truth``).
Also, the user has to provide the correct *truth_encryption_key* with every get request (see below).
When ``$H_RESPONSE`` is correct, the server responds with the encrypted key share.
The encrypted key share is returned simply as a byte array and not in JSON format.
**Response**:
:http:statuscode:`200 OK`:
`EncryptedKeyShare`_ is returned in body (in binary).
:http:statuscode:`202 Accepted`:
The escrow provider will respond out-of-band (i.e. SMS).
The body may contain human-readable instructions on next steps.
:http:statuscode:`208 Already Reported`:
An authentication challenge was recently send, client should
simply respond to the pending challenge.
:http:statuscode:`303 See other`:
The provider redirects for authentication (i.e. video identification/WebRTC).
If the client is not a browser, it should launch a browser at the URL
given in the ``Location`` header and allow the user to re-try the operation
after successful authorization.
:http:statuscode:`402 Payment required`:
The service requires payment for access to truth.
See the Taler payment protocol specification for how to pay.
The response body MAY provide alternative means for payment.
:http:statuscode:`403 Forbidden`:
The server requires a valid "response" to the challenge associated with the UUID.
:http:statuscode:`404 Not found`:
The server does not know any truth under the given UUID.
:http:statuscode:`410 Gone`:
The server has not (recently) issued a challenge under the given UUID,
but a reply was provided. (This does not apply for secure question.)
:http:statuscode:`417 Expectation Failed`:
The decrypted ``truth`` does not match the expectations of the authentication
backend, i.e. a phone number for sending an SMS is not a number, or
an e-mail address for sending an E-mail is not a valid e-mail address.
:http:statuscode:`503 Service Unavailable`:
Server is out of Service.
*Truth-Decryption-Key*: Key used to encrypt the **truth** (see encrypted_truth within `TruthUploadRequest`_) and which has to provided by the user. The key is stored with
the according `EscrowMethod`_. The server needs this key to get the info out of `TruthUploadRequest`_ needed to verify the ``$RESPONSE``.
**Details:**
.. _EncryptedKeyShare:
.. ts:def:: EncryptedKeyShare
interface EncryptedKeyShare {
// Nonce used to compute the decryption (iv,key) pair.
nonce_i: [32]; //bytearray
// Authentication tag.
aes_gcm_tag_i: [16]; //bytearray
// Encrypted key-share in base32 encoding.
// After decryption, this yields a `KeyShare`. Note that
// the `KeyShare` MUST be encoded as a fixed-size binary
// block (instead of in JSON encoding).
//
// HKDF for the key generation must include the
// string "eks" as salt.
// Depending on the method,
// the HKDF may additionally include
// bits from the response (i.e. some hash over the
// answer to the security question).
encrypted_key_share_i: [32]; //bytearray
}
.. _KeyShare:
.. ts:def:: KeyShare
interface KeyShare {
// Key material to concatenate with policy_salt and KDF to derive
// the key to decrypt the master key.
key_share: [32]; //bytearray
// Signature over method, UUID, and ``key_share``.
account_sig: EddsaSignature;
}
---------------------
Anastasis Reducer API
---------------------
This section describes the Anastasis Reducer API which is used by client applications
to store or load the different states the client application can have.
The reducer takes a state_ in JSON syntax and returns the new state in JSON syntax.
For example a **state** may take the following structure:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "CONTINENT_SELECTING",
"continents": [
"Europe",
"North_America"
]
}
The new state depends on the previous one and on the transition action_ with its
arguments given to the reducer. A **transition argument** also is a statement in JSON syntax:
.. code-block:: json
{
"continent": "Europe"
}
The new state returned by the reducer with the state and transition argument defined
above would look like following for the transition action_ ``select_continent``:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "COUNTRY_SELECTING",
"continents": [
"Europe",
"North_America"
],
"selected_continent": "Europe",
"countries": [
{
"code": "ch",
"name": "Switzerland",
"continent": "Europe",
"name_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Schweiz",
"de_CH": "Schwiiz",
"fr": "Suisse",
"en": "Swiss"
},
"currency": "CHF"
},
{
"code": "de",
"name": "Germany",
"continent": "Europe",
"continent_i18n": {
"de": "Europa"
},
"name_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Deutschland",
"de_CH": "Deutschland",
"fr": "Allemagne",
"en": "Germany"
},
"currency": "EUR"
}
]
}
States
^^^^^^
Overall, the reducer knows the following states:
- **ERROR**: The transition led to an error. No further transitions are possible from
this state, but the client may want to continue from a previous state.
- **CONTINENT_SELECTING**: The user should specify the continent where they are living,
so that we can show a list of countries to choose from.
- **COUNTRY_SELECTING**: The user should specify the country where they are living,
so that we can determine appropriate attributes, currencies and Anastasis
providers.
- **USER_ATTRIBUTES_COLLECTING**: The user should provide the country-specific personal
attributes.
- **AUTHENTICATIONS_EDITING**: The user should add authentication methods to be used
during recovery.
- **POLICIES_REVIEWING**: The user should review the recovery policies.
- **SECRET_EDITING**: The user should edit the secret to be backed up.
- **TRUTHS_PAYING**: The user needs to pay for one or more uploads of data associated
with an authentication method.
- **POLICIES_PAYING**: The user needs to pay for storing the recovery policy document.
- **BACKUP_FINISHED**: A backup has been successfully generated.
- **CHALLENGE_SELECTING**: The user needs to select an authorization challenge to
proceed with recovery.
- **CHALLENGE_PAYING**: The user needs to pay to proceed with the authorization challenge.
- **CHALLENGE_SOLVING**: The user needs to solve the authorization challenge.
- **RECOVERY_FINISHED**: The secret of the user has been recovered.
State names:
- In SELECTING-states, the user has to choose one value out of a predefined set of values (for example a continent out of a set of continents).
- In COLLECTING-states, the user has to give certain values.
- In EDITING-states, the user is free to choose which values he wants to give.
- In REVEIWING-states, the user may make a few choices, but primarily is expected to affirm something.
- in PAYING-states, the user must make a payment.
- in FINISHED-states, the operation has definitively concluded.
Backup Reducer
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.. _state:
.. _action:
.. figure:: anastasis_reducer_backup.png
:name: fig-anastasis_reducer_backup
:alt: fig-anastasis_reducer_backup
:scale: 35 %
:align: center
Backup states and their transitions.
The illustration above shows the different states the reducer can have during a backup
process.
Recovery Reducer
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
.. figure:: anastasis_reducer_recovery.png
:name: fig-anastasis_reducer_recovery
:alt: fig-anastasis_reducer_recovery
:scale: 35 %
:align: center
Recovery states and their transitions.
The illustration above shows the different states the reducer can have during a recovery
process.
Reducer transitions
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
In the following, the individual transitions will be specified in more detail.
Note that we only show fields added by the reducer, typically the previous
state is preserved to enable "back" transitions to function smoothly.
Initial state
-------------
The initial states for backup and recovery processes are:
**Initial backup state:**
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "CONTINENT_SELECTING",
"continents": [
"Europe",
"North America"
]
}
**Initial recovery state:**
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CONTINENT_SELECTING",
"continents": [
"Europe",
"North America"
]
}
Here, "continents" is an array of English strings with the names of the
continents which contain countries for which Anastasis could function (based
on having providers that are known to operate and rules being provided for
user attributes from those countries).
For internationalization, another field ``continents_i18n`` may be present.
This field would be a map of language names to arrays of translated
continent names:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CONTINENT_SELECTING",
"continents": [
"Europe",
"North America"
]
"continents_i18n":
{
"de_DE" : [
"Europa",
"Nordamerika"
],
"de_CH" : [
"Europa",
"Nordamerika"
]
}
}
Translations must be given in the same order as the main English array.
Common transitions
------------------
**select_continent:**
Here the user specifies the continent they live on. Arguments (example):
.. code-block:: json
{
"continent": "Europe"
}
The continent must be given using the English name from the ``continents`` array.
Using a translated continent name is invalid and may result in failure.
The reducer returns an updated state with a list of countries to choose from,
for example:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "COUNTRY_SELECTING",
"selected_continent": "Europe",
"countries": [
{
"code": "ch",
"name": "Switzerland",
"continent": "Europe",
"name_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Schweiz",
"de_CH": "Schwiiz",
"fr": "Suisse",
"en": "Swiss"
},
"currency": "CHF"
},
{
"code": "de",
"name": "Germany",
"continent": "Europe",
"continent_i18n": {
"de": "Europa"
},
"name_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Deutschland",
"de_CH": "Deutschland",
"fr": "Allemagne",
"en": "Germany"
},
"currency": "EUR"
}
]
}
Here ``countries`` is an array of countries on the ``selected_continent``. For
each country, the ``code`` is the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code. The
``continent`` is only present because some countries span continents, the
information is redundant and will always match ``selected_continent``. The
``name`` is the name of the country in English, internationalizations of the
name may be provided in ``name_i18n``. The ``currency`` is **an** official
currency of the country, if a country has multiple currencies, it may appear
multiple times in the list. In this case, the user should select the entry
with the currency they intend to pay with. It is also possible for users
to select a currency that does not match their country, but user interfaces
should by default try to use currencies that match the user's residence.
**select_country:**
Selects the country (via the country code) and specifies the currency.
The latter is needed as some countries have more than one currency,
and some use-cases may also involve users insisting on paying with
foreign currency.
Arguments (example):
.. code-block:: json
{
"country_code": "de",
"currency": "EUR"
}
The ``country_code`` must be an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code from
the array of ``countries`` of the reducer's state. The ``currency``
field must be a valid currency accepted by the Taler payment system.
The reducer returns a new state with the list of attributes the
user is expected to provide, as well as possible authentication
providers that accept payments in the selected currency:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "USER_ATTRIBUTES_COLLECTING",
"selected_country": "de",
"currency": "EUR",
"required_attributes": [
{
"type": "string",
"name": "full_name",
"label": "Full name",
"label_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Vollstaendiger Name",
"de_CH": "Vollstaendiger. Name",
"fr": "Nom complet",
"en": "Full name"
},
"widget": "anastasis_gtk_ia_full_name",
"uuid" : "9e8f463f-575f-42cb-85f3-759559997331"
},
{
"type": "date",
"name": "birthdate",
"label": "Birthdate",
"label_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Geburtsdatum",
"de_CH": "Geburtsdatum",
"fr": "Date de naissance",
"en": "Birthdate"
},
"uuid" : "83d655c7-bdb6-484d-904e-80c1058c8854"
"widget": "anastasis_gtk_ia_birthdate"
},
{
"type": "string",
"name": "tax_number",
"label": "Taxpayer identification number",
"label_i18n":{
"de_DE": "Steuerliche Identifikationsnummer",
"de_CH": "Steuerliche Identifikationsnummer",
"en": "German taxpayer identification number"
},
"widget": "anastasis_gtk_ia_tax_de",
"uuid": "dae48f85-e3ff-47a4-a4a3-ed981ed8c3c6",
"validation-regex": "^[0-9]{11}$",
"validation-logic": "DE_TIN_check"
},
{
"type": "string",
"name": "social_security_number",
"label": "Social security number",
"label_i18n": {
"de_DE": "Sozialversicherungsnummer",
"de_CH": "Sozialversicherungsnummer",
"fr": "Numéro de sécurité sociale",
"en": "Social security number"
},
"widget": "anastasis_gtk_ia_ssn",
"validation-regex": "^[0-9]{8}[[:upper:]][0-9]{3}$",
"validation-logic": "DE_SVN_check"
"optional" : true
}
],
"authentication_providers": {
"http://localhost:8089/": {
"http_status": 200,
"methods": [
{ "type" : "question",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.0" },
{ "type" : "sms",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.5" }
],
"annual_fee": "EUR:4.99",
"truth_upload_fee": "EUR:4.99",
"liability_limit": "EUR:1",
"currency": "EUR",
"truth_lifetime": { "d_ms" : 50000000 },
"storage_limit_in_megabytes": 1,
"provider_name": "Anastasis 4",
"salt": "CXAPCKSH9D3MYJTS9536RHJHCW"
},
"http://localhost:8088/": {
"http_status": 200,
"methods": [
{ "type" : "question",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.01" },
{ "type" : "sms",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.55" }
],
"annual_fee": "EUR:0.99",
"truth_upload_fee": "EUR:3.99",
"liability_limit": "EUR:1",
"currency": "EUR",
"truth_lifetime": { "d_ms" : 50000000 },
"storage_limit_in_megabytes": 1,
"provider_name": "Anastasis 4",
"salt": "CXAPCKSH9D3MYJTS9536RHJHCW"
}
}
}
The array of ``required_attributes`` contains attributes about the user
that must be provided includes:
- **type**: The type of the attribute, for now only ``string`` and ``date`` are
supported.
- **name**: The name of the attribute, this is the key under which the
attribute value must be provided later. The name must be unique per response.
- **label**: A human-readable description of the attribute in English.
Translated descriptions may be provided under **label_i18n**.
- **uuid**: A UUID that uniquely identifies identical attributes across
different countries. Useful to preserve values should the user enter
some attributes, and then switch to another country. Note that
attributes must not be preserved if they merely have the same **name**,
only the **uuid** will be identical if the semantics is identicial.
- **widget**: An optional name of a widget that is known to nicely render
the attribute entry in user interfaces where named widgets are
supported.
- **validation-regex**: An optional extended POSIX regular expression
that is to be used to validate (string) inputs to ensure they are
well-formed.
- **validation-logic**: Optional name of a function that should be called
to validate the input. If the function is not known to the particular
client, the respective validation can be skipped (at the expense of
typos by users not being detected, possibly rendering secrets
irrecoverable).
- **optional**: Optional boolean field that, if ``true``, indicates that
this attribute is not actually required but optional and users MAY leave
it blank in case they do not have the requested information. Used for
common fields that apply to some large part of the population but are
not sufficiently universal to be actually required.
The authentication providers are listed under a key that is the
base URL of the service. For each provider, the following
information is provided if the provider was successfully contacted:
- **http_status**: HTTP status code, always ``200`` on success.
- **methods**: Array of authentication methods supported by this
provider. Includes the **type** of the authentication method
and the **usage_fee** (how much the user must pay for authorization
using this method during recovery).
- **annual_fee**: Fee the provider charges to store the recovery
policy for one year.
- **truth_upload_fee**: Fee the provider charges to store a key share.
- **truth_lifetime**: Taler-style relative time that specifies how
long the provider will store truth data (key shares) after an upload.
- **liability_limit**: Amount the provider can be held liable for in
case a key share or recovery document cannot be recovered due to
provider failures.
- **currency**: Currency in which the provider wants to be paid,
will match all of the fees.
- **storage_limit_in_megabytes**: Maximum size of an upload (for
both recovery document and truth data) in megabytes.
- **provider_name**: Human-readable name of the provider's business.
- **salt**: Salt value used by the provider, used to derive the
user's identity at this provider. Should be unique per provider,
and must never change for a given provider. The salt is
base32 encoded.
If contacting the provider failed, the information returned is:
- **http_status**: HTTP status code (if available, possibly 0 if
we did not even obtain an HTTP response).
- **error_code**: Taler error code, never 0.
**add_provider**:
This operation can be performed in state ``USER_ATTRIBUTES_COLLECTING``. It
adds one or more Anastasis providers to the list of providers the reducer
should henceforth consider. Note that removing providers is not possible at
this time.
Here, the client must provide an array with the base URLs of the
providers to add, for example:
.. code-block:: json
{
"urls": [
"http://localhost:8888/",
"http://localhost:8089/"
]
}
Note that existing providers will remain in the state. The following is an
example for an expected new state where the service on port 8089 is
unreachable, the service on port 8088 was previously known, and service on
port 8888 was now added:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "USER_ATTRIBUTES_COLLECTING",
"authentication_providers": {
"http://localhost:8089/": {
"error_code": 11,
"http_status": 0
},
"http://localhost:8088/": {
"http_status": 200,
"methods": [
{ "type" : "question",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.01" },
{ "type" : "sms",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.55" }
],
"annual_fee": "EUR:0.99",
"truth_upload_fee": "EUR:3.99",
"liability_limit": "EUR:1",
"currency": "EUR",
"truth_lifetime": { "d_ms" : 50000000 },
"storage_limit_in_megabytes": 1,
"provider_name": "Anastasis 4",
"salt": "CXAPCKSH9D3MYJTS9536RHJHCW"
}
"http://localhost:8888/": {
"methods": [
{ "type" : "question",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.01" },
{ "type" : "sms",
"usage_fee" : "EUR:0.55" }
],
"annual_fee": "EUR:0.99",
"truth_upload_fee": "EUR:3.99",
"liability_limit": "EUR:1",
"currency": "EUR",
"truth_lifetime": { "d_ms" : 50000000 },
"storage_limit_in_megabytes": 1,
"provider_name": "Anastasis 42",
"salt": "BXAPCKSH9D3MYJTS9536RHJHCX"
}
}
}
Backup transitions
------------------
**enter_user_attributes:**
This transition provides the user's personal attributes. The specific set of
attributes required depends on the country of residence of the user. Some
attributes may be optional, in which case they should be omitted entirely
(that is, not simply be set to ``null`` or an empty string). Example
arguments would be:
.. code-block:: json
{
"identity_attributes": {
"full_name": "Max Musterman",
"social_security_number": "123456789",
"birthdate": "2000-01-01",
"birthplace": "Earth"
}
}
Note that at this stage, the state machines between backup and
recovery diverge and the ``recovery_state`` will begin to look
very different from the ``backup_state``.
For backups, if all required attributes are present, the reducer will
transition to an ``AUTHENTICATIONS_EDITING`` state with the attributes added
to it:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "AUTHENTICATIONS_EDITING",
"identity_attributes": {
"full_name": "Max Musterman",
"social_security_number": "123456789",
"birthdate": "2000-01-01",
"birthplace": "Earth"
}
}
If required attributes are missing, do not match the required regular
expression, or fail the custom validation logic, the reducer SHOULD transition
to an error state indicating what was wrong about the input. A reducer that
does not support some specific validation logic MAY accept the invalid input
and proceed anyway. The error state will include a Taler error code that
is specific to the failure, and optional details. Example:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "ERROR",
"code": 8404,
"hint": "An input did not match the regular expression.",
"detail": "social_security_number"
}
Clients may safely repeat this transition to validate the user's inputs
until they satisfy all of the constraints. This way, the user interface
does not have to perform the input validation directly.
**add_authentication**:
This transition adds an authentication method. The method must be supported
by one or more providers that are included in the current state. Adding an
authentication method requires specifying the ``type`` and ``instructions`` to
be given to the user. The ``challenge`` is encrypted and stored at the
Anastasis provider. The specific semantics of the value depend on the
``type``. Typical challenges values are a phone number (to send an SMS to),
an e-mail address (to send a PIN code to) or the answer to a security
question. Note that these challenge values will still be encrypted (and
possibly hashed) before being given to the Anastasis providers.
Note that the ``challenge`` must be given in Crockford Base32 encoding, as it
MAY include binary data (such as a photograph of the user). In the latter
case, the optional ``mime_type`` field must be provided to give the MIME type
of the value encoded in ``challenge``.
.. code-block:: json
{
"authentication_method":
{
"type": "question",
"mime_type" : "text/plain",
"instructions" : "What is your favorite GNU package?",
"challenge" : "E1QPPS8A",
}
}
If the information provided is valid, the reducer will add the new
authentication method to the array of authentication methods:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "AUTHENTICATIONS_EDITING",
"authentication_methods": [
{
"type": "question",
"mime_type" : "text/plain",
"instructions" : "What is your favorite GNU package?",
"challenge" : "E1QPPS8A",
},
{
"type": "email",
"instructions" : "E-mail to user@*le.com",
"challenge": "ENSPAWJ0CNW62VBGDHJJWRVFDM50"
}
]
}
**delete_authentication**:
This transition can be used to remove an authentication method from the
array of authentication methods. It simply requires the index of the
authentication method to remove. Note that the array is 0-indexed:
.. code-block:: json
{
"auth_method_index": 1
}
Assuming we begin with the state from the example above, this would
remove the ``email`` authentication method, resulting in the following
response:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "AUTHENTICATIONS_EDITING",
"authentication_methods": [
{
"type": "question",
"mime_type" : "text/plain",
"instructions" : "What is your favorite GNU package?",
"challenge" : "gdb",
}
]
}
If the index is invalid, the reducer will instead
transition into an ``ERROR`` state.
**next** (from ``AUTHENTICATIONS_EDITING``):
This transition confirms that the user has finished adding (or removing)
authentication methods, and that the system should now automatically compute
a set of reasonable recovery policies.
This transition does not take any mandatory arguments. Optional arguments can
be provided to upload the recovery document only to a specific subset of the
providers:
.. code-block:: json
{
"provider_id": [
"http://localhost:8088/",
"http://localhost:8089/"
]
}
..note::
This is currently not supported (see `bug 6760 `_),
the current implementation of the
reducer ignores this optional argument.
The resulting state provides the suggested recovery policies in a way suitable
for presentation to the user:
.. code-block:: javascript
{
"backup_state": "POLICIES_REVIEWING",
"policies": [
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 0,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 2,
"provider": "http://localhost:8087/"
}
]
},
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 0,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 3,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
}
]
}
]
}
For each recovery policy, the state includes the specific details of which
authentication ``methods`` must be solved to recovery the secret using this
policy. The ``methods`` array specifies the index of the
``authentication_method`` in the ``authentication_methods`` array, as well as
the provider that was selected to supervise this authentication.
If no authentication method was provided, the reducer will transition into an
``ERROR`` state instead of suggesting policies.
**add_policy**:
Using this transition, the user can add an additional recovery policy to the
state. The argument format is the same that is used in the existing state.
An example for a possible argument would thus be:
.. code-block:: javascript
{
"policy": [
{
"auth_method_index": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
},
{
"auth_method_index": 3,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
}
]
}
Note that the specified providers must already be in the
``authentication_providers`` of the state. You cannot add new providers at
this stage. The reducer will simply attempt to append the suggested policy to
the "policies" array, returning an updated state:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "POLICIES_REVIEWING",
"policies": [
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 0,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
}
]
},
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 0,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 2,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
}
]
},
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 2,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
}
]
},
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 3,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
}
]
}
]
}
If the new policy is invalid, for example because it adds an unknown
authentication method, or the selected provider does not support the type of
authentication, the reducer will transition into an ``ERROR`` state instead of
adding the new policy.
**delete_policy:**
This transition allows the deletion of a recovery policy. The argument
simply specifies the index of the policy to delete, for example:
.. code-block:: json
{
"policy_index": 3
}
Given as input the state from the example above, the expected new state would
be:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "POLICIES_REVIEWING",
"policies": [
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 0,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
}
]
},
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 0,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 2,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
}
]
},
{
"methods": [
{
"authentication_method": 1,
"provider": "http://localhost:8089/"
},
{
"authentication_method": 2,
"provider": "http://localhost:8088/"
}
]
}
]
}
If the index given is invalid, the reducer will transition into an ``ERROR`` state
instead of deleting a policy.
**next** (from ``POLICIES_REVIEWING``):
Using this transition, the user confirms that the policies in the current
state are acceptable. The transition does not take any arguments.
The reducer will simply transition to the ``SECRET_EDITING`` state:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "SECRET_EDITING",
}
If the array of ``policies`` is currently empty, the reducer will transition
into an ``ERROR`` state instead of allowing the user to continue.
**enter_secret:**
This transition provides the reducer with the actual core ``secret`` of the user
that Anastasis is supposed to backup (and possibly recover). The argument is
simply the Crockford-Base32 encoded ``value`` together with its ``mime`` type,
for example:
.. code-block:: javascript
{
"secret": {
"value": "EDJP6WK5EG50",
"mime" : "text/plain"
}
}
If the application is unaware of the format, it set the ``mime`` field to ``null``.
After adding a secret, the reducer may transition into different states
depending on whether payment(s) are necessary. If payments are needed, the
``secret`` will be stored in the state under ``core_secret``. Applications
should be careful when persisting the resulting state, as the ``core_secret``
is not protected in the ``PAYING`` states. The ``PAYING`` states only differ
in terms of what the payments are for (key shares or the recovery document),
in all cases the state simply includes an array of Taler URIs that refer to
payments that need to be made with the Taler wallet.
If all payments are complete, the reducer will transition into the
``BACKUP_FINISHED`` state and (if applicable) delete the ``core_secret`` as an
additional safety measure.
Example results are thus:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "TRUTHS_PAYING",
"core_secret" : "DATA",
"payments": [
"taler://pay/...",
"taler://pay/..."
]
}
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "POLICIES_PAYING",
"core_secret" : "DATA",
"payments": [
"taler://pay/...",
"taler://pay/..."
]
}
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "BACKUP_FINISHED",
}
**pay:**
This transition suggests to the reducer that a payment may have been made or
is immanent, and that the reducer should check with the Anastasis service
provider to see if the operation is now possible. The operation takes one
optional argument, which is a ``timeout`` value that specifies how long the
reducer may wait (in long polling) for the payment to complete:
.. code-block:: json
{
"timeout": { "d_ms" : 5000 },
}
The specified timeout is passed on to the Anastasis service provider(s), which
will wait this long before giving up. If no timeout is given, the check is
done as quickly as possible without additional delays. The reducer will continue
to either an updated state with the remaining payment requests, to the
``BACKUP_FINISHED`` state (if all payments have been completed and the backup
finished), or into an ``ERROR`` state in case there was an irrecoverable error,
indicating the specific provider and how it failed. An example for this
final error state would be:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "ERROR",
"http_status" : 500,
"upload_status" : 52,
"provider_url" : "https://bad.example.com/",
}
Here, the fields have the following meaning:
- **http_status** is the HTTP status returned by the Anastasis provider.
- **upload_status** is the Taler error code return by the provider.
- **provider_url** is the base URL of the failing provider.
In the above example, 52 would thus imply that the Anastasis provider failed to
store information into its database.
Recovery transitions
--------------------
**enter_user_attributes:**
This transition provides the user's personal attributes. The specific set of
attributes required depends on the country of residence of the user. Some
attributes may be optional, in which case they should be omitted entirely
(that is, not simply be set to ``null`` or an empty string). The
arguments are identical to the **enter_user_attributes** transition from
the backup process. Example arguments would thus be:
.. code-block:: json
{
"identity_attributes": {
"full_name": "Max Musterman",
"social_security_number": "123456789",
"birthdate": "2000-01-01",
"birthplace": "Earth"
}
}
However, in contrast to the backup process, the reducer will attempt to
retrieve the latest recovery document from all known providers for the
selected currency given the above inputs. If a recovery document was found
by any provider, the reducer will attempt to load it and transition to
a state where the user can choose which challenges to satisfy:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SELECTING",
"recovery_information": {
"challenges": [
{
"uuid": "MW2R3RCBZPHNC78AW8AKWRCHF9KV3Y82EN62T831ZP54S3K5599G",
"cost": "TESTKUDOS:0",
"type": "question",
"instructions": "q1"
},
{
"uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"cost": "TESTKUDOS:0",
"type": "email",
"instructions": "e-mail address m?il@f*.bar"
}
],
"policies": [
[
{
"uuid": "MW2R3RCBZPHNC78AW8AKWRCHF9KV3Y82EN62T831ZP54S3K5599G"
},
{
"uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0"
}
]
],
"provider_url": "http://localhost:8088/",
"version": 1
},
"recovery_document": {
...
}
}
The ``recovery_document`` is an internal representation of the recovery
information and of no concern to the user interface. The pertinent information
is in the ``recovery_information``. Here, the ``challenges`` array is a list
of possible challenges the user could attempt to solve next, while ``policies``
is an array of policies, with each policy being an array of challenges.
Satisfying all of the challenges of one of the policies will enable the secret
to be recovered. The ``provider_url`` from where the recovery document was
obtained and its ``version`` are also provided. Each challenge comes with
four mandatory fields:
- **uuid**: A unique identifier of the challenge; this is what the
UUIDs in the policies array refer to, but also this UUID may be
included in messages sent to the user. They allow the user to
distinguish different PIN/TANs should say the same phone number be
used for SMS-authentication with different providers.
- **cost**: This is the amount the Anastasis provider will charge
to allow the user to pass the challenge.
- **type**: This is the type of the challenge, as a string.
- **instructions**: Contains additional important hints for the user
to allow the user to satisfy the challenge. It typically includes
an abbreviated form of the contact information or the security
question. Details depend on ``type``.
If a recovery document was not found, either the user never performed
a backup, entered incorrect attributes or used a provider not yet in
the list of Anastasis providers. Hence, the user must now either
select a different provider, or go ``back`` and update the identity
attributes. In the case a recovery document was not found, the
transition fails, returning the error code and a human-readable error
message together with a transition failure:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "ERROR",
"error_message": "account unknown to Anastasis server",
"error_code": 9,
}
Here, the ``error_code`` is from the ``enum ANASTASIS_RecoveryStatus``
and describes precisely what failed about the download, while the
``error_message`` is a human-readable (English) explanation of the code.
Applications may want to translate the message using GNU gettext;
translations should be available in the "anastasis" text domain.
However, in general it should be sufficient to display the slightly
more generic Taler error code that is returned with the new state.
**change_version:**
Even if a recovery document was found, it is possible that the user
intended to recover a different version, or recover a backup where
the recovery document is stored at a different provider. Thus, the
reducer allows the user to explicitly switch to a different provider
or recovery document version using the ``change_version`` transition,
which takes a provider URL and policy version as arguments:
.. code-block:: json
{
"provider_url": "https://localhost:8080/",
"version": 2
}
Note that using a version of 0 implies fetching ``the latest version``. The
resulting states are the same as those of the ``enter_user_attributes``
transition, except that the recovery document version is not necessarily the
latest available version at the provider.
**select_challenge:**
Selecting a challenge takes different, depending on the state of the payment.
A comprehensive example for ``select_challenge`` would be:
.. code-block:: json
{
"uuid": "80H646H5ZBR453C02Y5RT55VQSJZGM5REWFXVY0SWXY1TNE8CT30"
"timeout" : { "d_ms" : 5000 },
"payment_secret": "3P4561HAMHRRYEYD6CM6J7TS5VTD5SR2K2EXJDZEFSX92XKHR4KG"
}
The ``uuid`` field is mandatory and specifies the selected challenge.
The other fields are optional, and are needed in case the user has
previously been requested to pay for the challenge. In this case,
the ``payment_secret`` identifies the previous payment request, and
``timeout`` says how long the Anastasis service should wait for the
payment to be completed before giving up (long polling).
Depending on the type of the challenge and the need for payment, the
reducer may transition into ``CHALLENGE_SOLVING`` or ``CHALLENGE_PAYING``
states. In ``CHALLENGE_SOLVING``, the new state will primarily specify
the selected challenge:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "CHALLENGE_SOLVING",
"selected_challenge_uuid": "80H646H5ZBR453C02Y5RT55VQSJZGM5REWFXVY0SWXY1TNE8CT30"
}
In ``CHALLENGE_PAYING``, the new state will include instructions for payment
in the ``challenge_feedback``. In general, ``challenge_feedback`` includes
information about attempted challenges, with the final state being ``solved``:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SELECTING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"challenge_feedback": {
"80H646H5ZBR453C02Y5RT55VQSJZGM5REWFXVY0SWXY1TNE8CT30" : {
"state" : "solved"
}
}
}
Challenges feedback for a challenge can have many different ``state`` values
that applications must all handle. States other than ``solved`` are:
- **payment**: Here, the user must pay for a challenge. An example would be:
.. code-block:: json
{
"backup_state": "CHALLENGE_PAYING",
"selected_challenge_uuid": "80H646H5ZBR453C02Y5RT55VQSJZGM5REWFXVY0SWXY1TNE8CT30",
"challenge_feedback": {
"80H646H5ZBR453C02Y5RT55VQSJZGM5REWFXVY0SWXY1TNE8CT30" : {
"state" : "payment",
"taler_pay_uri" : "taler://pay/...",
"provider" : "https://localhost:8080/",
"payment_secret" : "3P4561HAMHRRYEYD6CM6J7TS5VTD5SR2K2EXJDZEFSX92XKHR4KG"
}
}
}
- **body**: Here, the server provided an HTTP reply for
how to solve the challenge, but the reducer could not parse
them into a known format. A mime-type may be provided and may
help parse the details.
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SOLVING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "body",
"body": "CROCKFORDBASE32ENCODEDBODY",
"http_status": 403,
"mime_type" : "anything/possible"
}
}
}
- **hint**: Here, the server provided human-readable hint for
how to solve the challenge. Note that the ``hint`` provided this
time is from the Anastasis provider and may differ from the ``instructions``
for the challenge under ``recovery_information``:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SOLVING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "hint",
"hint": "Recovery TAN send to email mail@DOMAIN",
"http_status": 403
}
}
}
- **details**: Here, the server provided a detailed JSON status response
related to solving the challenge:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SOLVING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "details",
"details": {
"code": 8111,
"hint": "The client's response to the challenge was invalid.",
"detail" : null
},
"http_status": 403
}
}
}
- **redirect**: To solve the challenge, the user must visit the indicated
Web site at ``redirect_url``, for example to perform video authentication:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SOLVING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "redirect",
"redirect_url": "https://videoconf.example.com/",
"http_status": 303
}
}
}
- **server-failure**: This indicates that the Anastasis provider encountered
a failure and recovery using this challenge cannot proceed at this time.
Examples for failures might be that the provider is unable to send SMS
messages at this time due to an outage. The body includes details about
the failure. The user may try again later or continue with other challenges.
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SELECTING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "server-failure",
"http_status": "500",
"error_code": 52
}
}
}
- **truth-unknown**: This indicates that the Anastasis provider is unaware of
the specified challenge. This is typically a permanent failure, and user
interfaces should not allow users to re-try this challenge.
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SELECTING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "truth-unknown",
"error_code": 8108
}
}
}
- **rate-limit-exceeded**:
.. code-block:: json
{
"recovery_state": "CHALLENGE_SELECTING",
"recovery_information": {
// ...
}
"selected_challenge_uuid": "TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0",
"challenge_feedback": {
"TXYKGE1SJZHJ4M2FKSV1P2RZVNTHZFB9E3A79QE956D3SCAWXPK0": {
"state": "rate-limit-exceeded",
"error_code": 8121
}
}
}
**pay:**
With a ``pay`` transition, the application indicates to the reducer that
a payment may have been made. Here, it is again possible to specify an
optional ``timeout`` argument for long-polling, for example:
.. code-block:: json
{
"payment_secret": "ABCDADF242525AABASD52525235ABABFDABABANALASDAAKASDAS"
"timeout" : { "d_ms" : 5000 },
}
Depending on the type of the challenge and the result of the operation, the
new state may be ``CHALLENGE_SOLVING`` (if say the SMS was now sent to the
user), ``CHALLENGE_SELECTING`` (if the answer to the security question was
correct), ``RECOVERY_FINISHED`` (if this was the last challenge that needed to
be solved) or still ``CHALLENGE_PAYING`` (if the challenge was not actually
paid for). For sample messages, see the different types of
``challenge_feedback`` in the section about ``select_challenge``.
**solve_challenge:**
Solving a challenge takes various formats, depending on the type of the
challenge and what is known about the answer. The different supported
formats are:
.. code-block:: json
{
"answer": "answer to security question"
}
.. code-block:: json
{
"pin": 1234
}
.. code-block:: json
{
"hash": "SOMEBASE32ENCODEDHASHVALUE"
}
.. _anastasis-auth-methods:
----------------------
Authentication Methods
----------------------
This section describes the supported authentication methods in detail. We
note that the server implements rate limiting for all authentication methods
to ensure that malicious strong attackers cannot guess the values by
brute-force. Typically, a user is given three attempts per hour to enter the
correct code from 2^63 possible values. Transmitted codes also come with an
expiration date. If the user re-requests a challenge to be sent, the same
challenge may be transmitted (with the three attempts counter not increasing!)
for a limited period of time (depending on the authentication method) before
the service eventually rotates to a fresh random code with a fresh retry
counter. Given the default value range and time intervals (which providers are
at liberty to adjust), brute-force attacks against this are expected to
succeed with a 50% probability after about 200000 years of attempts at the
maximum permissible frequency.
SMS (sms)
^^^^^^^^^
Sends an SMS with a code (prefixed with ``A-``) to the user's phone, including
a UUID which identifies the challenge the code is for. The user must send
this code back with his request (see ``$RESPONSE`` under `Managing truth`_).
If the transmitted code is correct, the server responses with the requested
encrypted key share.
Email verification (email)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Sends an email with a code (prefixed with ``A-``) to the user's mail address,
including a UUID which identifies the challenge the code is for. The user
must send this code back with his request (see ``$RESPONSE`` under `Managing
truth`_). If the transmitted code is correct, the server responses with the
requested encrypted key share.
Video identification (vid)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Requires the user to identify via video-call. In the video-call, the
user is told the code (prefixed with ``A-``) needed to authenticate.
The user is expected to delete all metadata revealing information about per
from the images before uploading them. Since the respective images must be
passed on to the video identification service in the event of password
recovery, it should be ensured that no further information about the user can
be derived from them.
Video identification will typically result in the Anastasis provider
requesting the user to be redirected to a Web site (or other URL) for the
video-call.
Security question (qa)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Asks the user a security question. The user sends back a **salted**
hash over the answer. The **question-salt** is stored encrypted as
part of the recovery document and never revealed to the providers. This
ensures that providers cannot derive the answer from the hash value.
Furthermore, the security question itself is also only in the recovery
document and never given to the Anastasis provider. A moderately expensive
hash function is used to further limit strong attackers that have obtained
the recovery document from brute-forcing the answer.
If the hash value matches with the one the server is expecting, the server
answers with the requested encrypted key share. However, unlike other
encrypted key shares, the encrypted key share of a security question uses a
special variation of the Anastasis encryption: Here, a different hash function
over the security answer is used to provide an additional **key-salt** for the
decryption of the (encrypted) **key share**. This ensures that the key share
remains irrecoverable without the answer even if the Anastasis provider
storing the security question is malicious.
Snail mail verification (post)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Sends physical mail (snail mail) with a code (prefixed with ``A-``) to the
user's mail address, including a UUID which identifies the challenge the code
is for. The user must send this code back with their request (see
``$RESPONSE`` under `Managing truth`_). If the transmitted code is correct,
the server responds with the requested encrypted key share.