From b6b96eebb81ff3daecced9b43218ba8eb3268cce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thien-Thi Nguyen Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2022 15:56:00 -0500 Subject: s/Postgres/PostgreSQL/g --- design-documents/011-auditor-db-sync.rst | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'design-documents/011-auditor-db-sync.rst') diff --git a/design-documents/011-auditor-db-sync.rst b/design-documents/011-auditor-db-sync.rst index f8229b63..d49503d2 100644 --- a/design-documents/011-auditor-db-sync.rst +++ b/design-documents/011-auditor-db-sync.rst @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ Proposed Solution * The auditor's "ingress" database should be well isolated from the rest of the auditor's system and database (different user accounts). The reason is that we should not - assume that the Postgres replication code is battle-tested with + assume that the PostgreSQL replication code is battle-tested with malicious parties in mind. -* The canonical Postgres synchronization between exchange and the +* The canonical PostgreSQL synchronization between exchange and the auditor's "ingress" database must use transport security. The above solution does not gracefully handle mutable tables on which @@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ A good order for replicating the tables should be: Alternatives ============ -* Copy the Postgres WAL, filter it for "illegal" operations +* Copy the PostgreSQL WAL, filter it for "illegal" operations and then apply it at the auditor end. Disadvantages: WAL filtering is not a common operation (format documented?), - this would be highly Postgres-specific, and would require + this would be highly PostgreSQL-specific, and would require complex work to write the filter. Also unsure how one could later recover gracefully from transient errors (say where the exchange recified a bogus DELETE). -- cgit v1.2.3