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-rw-r--r--taler-auditor-manual.rst6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/taler-auditor-manual.rst b/taler-auditor-manual.rst
index 1d84d45d..35f5a799 100644
--- a/taler-auditor-manual.rst
+++ b/taler-auditor-manual.rst
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ components:
fail to be imported due to constraint violations, this is an immediate serious
concern that must be addressed manually. The software only verifies the content
of a well-formed exchange database (well-formed with respect to SQL).
- For now, the GNU Taler reference implemenation
+ For now, the GNU Taler reference implementation
only supports Postgres, but the code could be easily extended to
support another DBMS.
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ the exchange operator obtains a *blob* with the data about denomination keys
that the exchange operator needs to get signed by every auditor the exchange
wishes (or is forced to) work with.
-In a normal scenario, an auditor must have some secure business proces to
+In a normal scenario, an auditor must have some secure business process to
receive the blob to sign (Website, manual delivery, ...). Note that the
blob does not contain confidential data, but signing the wrong keys would
be fatal. Given the blob, the auditor would sign it using:
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ Auditor implementation guide
The auditor implementation is split into five main processes, called
``taler-helper-auditor-XXX``. The split was done to realize the principle of
-least priviledge and to enable independent logic to be possibly run in
+least privilege and to enable independent logic to be possibly run in
parallel. Only the taler-wire-auditor must have (read-only) access to the
exchange's bank account, the other components only need access to the
database.