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-..
- This file is part of GNU TALER.
- Copyright (C) 2019 Taler Systems SA
-
- TALER is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
- terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software
- Foundation; either version 2.1, or (at your option) any later version.
-
- TALER is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
- WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR
- A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License along with
- TALER; see the file COPYING. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
-
- @author Christian Grothoff
- @author Dominik Meister
- @author Dennis Neufeld
-
-
-==========================================
-Specification of Cryptography in Anastasis
-==========================================
-This document specifies the Crypto used in Anastasis.
-
----------------
-Key derivations
----------------
-
-EdDSA and ECDHE public keys are always points on Curve25519 and represented
-using the standard 256 bit Ed25519 compact format. The binary representation
-is converted to Crockford Base32 when transmitted inside JSON or as part of
-URLs.
-
-To start, a user provides their private, unique and unforgettable
-**identifier** as a seed to identify their account. For example, this could
-be a social security number together with their full name. Specifics may
-depend on the cultural context, in this document we will simply refer to this
-information as the **user_identifier**.
-
-This user_identifier will be first hashed with SCrypt, to provide a **kdf_id**
-which will be used to derive other keys later. The Hash must also include the
-respective **server_salt**. This also ensures that the **kdf_id** is different
-on each server. The use of SCrypt and the respective server_salt is intended
-to make it difficult to brute-force **kdf_id** values and help protect user's
-privacy. Also this ensures that the kdf_ids on every server differs. However,
-we do not assume that the **user_identifier** or the **kdf_id** cannot be
-determined by an adversary performing a targeted attack, as a user's
-**user_identifier** is likely to always be known to state actors and may
-likely also be available to other actors.
-
-
-.. code-block:: tsref
-
- kdf_id := SCrypt( user_identifier, server_salt, keysize )
-
-**user_identifier**: The secret defined from the user beforehand.
-
-**server_salt**: The salt from the Server
-
-**keysize**: The desired output size of the KDF, here 32 bytes.
-
-
-Verification
-^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-For users to authorize **policy** operations we need an EdDSA key pair. As we
-cannot assure that the corresponding private key is truly secret, such policy
-operations must never be destructive: Should an adversary learn the private
-key, they could access (and with the kdf_id decrypt) the user's policy (but
-not the core secret), or upload a new version of the policy (but not delete an
-existing version).
-
-For the generation of the private key we use the kdf_id as the entropy source,
-hash it to derive a base secret which will then be processed to fit the
-requirements for EdDSA private keys. From the private key we can then
-generate the corresponding public key. Here, "ver" is used as a salt for the
-HKDF to ensure that the result differs from other cases where we hash
-kdf_id.
-
-.. code-block:: tsref
-
- ver_secret:= HKDF(kdf_id, "ver", keysize)
- eddsa_priv := eddsa_d_to_a(ver_secret)
- eddsa_pub := get_EdDSA_Pub(eddsa_priv)
-
-
-**HKDF()**: The HKDF-function uses to phases: First we use HMAC-SHA512 for the extraction phase, then HMAC-SHA256 is used for expansion phase.
-
-**kdf_id**: Hashed user_identifier.
-
-**key_size**: Size of the output, here 32 bytes.
-
-**ver_secret**: Derived key from the kdf_id, serves as intermediate step for the generation of the private key
-
-**eddsa_d_to_a()**: Function which converts the ver_key to a valid EdDSA private key. Specifically, assuming the value eddsa_priv is in a 32-byte array "digest", the function clears and sets certain bits as follows:
-
-.. code-block:: tsref
-
- digest[0] = (digest[0] & 0x7f) | 0x40;
- digest[31] &= 0xf8;
-
-**eddsa_priv**: The generated EdDSA private key.
-
-**eddsa_pub**: The generated EdDSA public key.
-
-
-Encryption
-^^^^^^^^^^
-
-For symmetric encryption of data we use AES256-GCM. For this we need a
-symmetric key and an initialization vector (IV). To ensure that the
-symmetric key changes for each encryption operation, we compute the
-key material using an HKDF over a nonce and the kdf_id.
-
-.. code-block:: tsref
-
- (iv,key) := HKDF(kdf_id, nonce, keysize + ivsize)
-
-**HKDF()**: The HKDF-function uses to phases: First we use HMAC-SHA512 for the extraction phase, then HMAC-SHA256 is used for expansion phase.
-
-**kdf_id**: Hashed user_identifier
-
-**keysize**: Size of the AES symmetric key, here 32 bytes
-
-**ivsize**: Size of the AES GCM IV, here 12 bytes
-
-**prekey**: Original key material.
-
-**nonce**: 32-byte nonce, must never match "ver" (which it cannot as the length is different).
-
-**key**: Symmetric key which is later used to encrypt the documents with AES256-GCM.
-
-**iv**: IV which will be used for AES-GCM
-
-----------------------------
-Key Usage
-----------------------------
-
-The keys we have generated, are now used to encrypt the recovery_document and
-the key_share of the user.
-
-
-Encryption
-^^^^^^^^^^
-
-Before every encryption a 32-byte nonce is generated.
-From this the symmetric key is computed as described above.
-We use AES256-GCM for the encryption of the recovery_document and
-key_share.
-
-.. code-block:: tsref
-
- (encrypted_recovery_document, aes_gcm_tag) = AES256_GCM(recovery_document, key, iv)
- (encrypted_key_share, aes_gcm_tag) = AES256_GCM(key_share, key, iv)
-
-**encrypted_recovery_document**: The encrypted RecoveryDocument (recovery_document) which contains the policies.
-
-**encrypted_key_share**: The encrypted KeyShare (key_share).
-
-Signatures
-^^^^^^^^^^
-
-The EdDSA keys are used to sign the data sent from the client to the
-server. Everything the client sends to server is signed. The following algorithm is equivalent for **Anastasis-Policy-Signature**.
-
-.. code-block:: tsref
-
- (anastasis-account-signature) = eddsa_sign(h_body, eddsa_priv)
- ver_res = eddsa_verifiy(h_body, anastasis-account-signature, eddsa_pub)
-
-**anastasis-account-signature**: Signature over the hash of body.
-
-**h_body**: The hashed body.
-
-**ver_res**: A boolean value. True: Verification passed, False: Verification failed.